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LABOR ARBITRATION AS A CONTINUATION OF THE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS*
CHARLES

B.

CRAVER**

In the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation. [In
the labor setting], arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife.
Since arbitration of labor disputes has quite different functions from
arbitration under an ordinary commercial agreement, the hostility
evinced by courts toward arbitration of commercial agreements has no
place here. For arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process
itself.
I.

INTRODUCTION

2
Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA)
declared it "to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce ...by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining ....
Section 1 provided private sector employees with "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations [and] to bargain collectively [with their respective employers] through representatives of
their own choosing." '4 The NLRA contributed significantly to the
growth of labor organizations and to the negotiation and execution of
collective bargaining agreements.
In 1947, Congress amended the NLRA to indicate specifically that
the duty to bargain involves "the mutual obligation of the employer and
the representative of the employees to ...confer in good faith with respect to... the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arisingthereunder....." Congress simultaneously enacted section 301 of the LaborManagement Relations Act (LMRA) 6 to provide federal district courts
with jurisdiction over suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements.
Copyright 1991 by Charles B. Craver.
* Professor of Law, George Washington University National Law Center. J.D., 1971, University of Michigan; M. Indus. & Lab. Rels., 1968, Cornell University School of Industrial and
Labor Relations; B.S., 1967, Cornell University.
1. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960)).
2. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1982)).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) (emphasis added).
6. 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982)).
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In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 7 the Supreme Court held that
section 301 did not merely grant federal courts jurisdiction over contract
actions involving collective agreements. The Court found that Congress
envisioned the development of an entire body of federal common law that
would be designed to reflect the unique nature of labor-management contracts.8 The Court further noted that since "the agreement to arbitrate
grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike,"9
judges should recognize that the NLRA and § 301 of the LMRA evidence a clear legislative policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration
provisions.
In two contemporaneous law review articles, Dean Harry Shulman10 and Professor Archibald Cox" cogently suggested that collective
bargaining agreements are not analogous to traditional commercial contracts. Professor Cox emphasized the fact that collective contracts often
lack precise language.
The parties to collective agreements share a degree of mutual interdependence which we seldom associate with simple contracts. Sooner or
later an employer and his employees must strike some kind of bargain.
The costs of disagreement are heavy. The pressure to reach agreement
is so great that the parties are often willing to contract although each
knows that the other places a different meaning upon the words and
they share only the common intent to postpone the issue12and take a
gamble upon an arbitrator's ruling if decision is required.
Dean Shulman noted also that employers and labor organizations are not
always able to define all of the terms of their relationship in their bargaining agreements.
There are too many people, too many problems, too many unforeseeable contingencies to make the words of the contract the exclusive
source of rights and duties. One cannot reduce all the rules governing
a community like an industrial plant to fifteen or even fifty pages.
Within the sphere of collective bargaining, the institutional characteristics and the governmental nature of the collective-bargaining process
demand a common law of the1 3 shop which implements and furnishes
the context of the agreement.
In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 14 the
7.
8.

353 U.S. 448 (1957).
Id. at 456-57.

9. Id. at 455.
10. Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999 (1955).
11. Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1959).
12. Id. at 1490-91. See Shulman, supra note 10, at 1004 ("Since the parties earnestly strive to
complete an agreement, there is almost irresistible pressure to find a verbal formula which is acceptable, even though its meaning to the two sides may in fact differ.").
13. Cox, supra note 11, at 1498-99. See Shulman, supra note 10, at 1007.
14. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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Supreme Court specifically accepted the Shulman-Cox description of collective contracts.
The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of
the parties. It is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate
....

It calls into being a new common law-the common law of a

particular industry or of a particular plant .... Because of the compulsion to reach agreement and the breadth of the matters covered, as
well as the need for a fairly concise and readable instrument, the product of negotiations (the written document) is . . . "a compilation of

diverse provisions: some provide objective criteria almost automatically applicable; some provide more or less specific standards which
require reason and judgment in their application; and some do little
more than leave problems to future consideration with an expression of
hope and good faith." [G]aps may be left to be filled in by reference to
the practices of the particular industry and of the various shops covered by the agreement. 15
The Supreme Court thus acknowledged that a labor-management agreement is like an industrial constitution. A collective contract provides
general guidelines regarding wages, hours, and working conditions, but
does not expressly define every conceivable employment term.
When the parties to a labor contract are unable to agree upon the
appropriate interpretation of a particular provision, or they maintain that
existing employment terms have been implicitly incorporated in their
agreement, they have several options available to them. The dissatisfied
party may interrupt operations through a strike or lockout. That party
may seek redress through costly, time-consuming, and cumbersome judicial procedures. It may alternatively employ grievance-arbitration procedures set forth in the bargaining agreement.
The Warrior& Gulf Court emphasized the importance of systems of
"industrial self-government" established by the negotiating parties
themselves. 16
[T]he grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is
at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government. Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of
private law for all the problems which may arise and to provide for
their solution in a way which will generally accord with the variant
needs and desires of the parties. The processing of disputes through
the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning
and
17
content are given to the collective bargaining agreement.
Almost all contemporary bargaining agreements provide for the res15. Id. at 578-80 (citing Shulman, supra note 10, at 1005).
16. Id. at 580.
17. Id. at 581.
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olution of disputes concerning the interpretation and application of contractual provisions through grievance-arbitration machinery.' 8 During
the initial stages of grievance-arbitration procedures, the parties endeavor to achieve an accommodation of their competing interests
through negotiations. In the relatively infrequent instances in which no
mutual accord is attained, and the losing party continues to feel sufficiently aggrieved, arbitration may be invoked.' 9
Some experts have suggested that grievance arbitration is not part of
the collective bargaining process. These experts maintain that arbitral
procedures are more akin to judicial proceedings.
I do not regard arbitration as a part of the bargaining process. I see it
as a quasi-judicial function--construing and applying contract terms
to ascertained fact situations. If the contract is ambiguous but covers
the matter involved, the arbitrator must construe, apply and even
adapt. If the matter is not covered at20all, he should not read into the
contract something that is not there.
Other experts have noted that grievance arbitration is not merely a
substitute for judicial action.
[A]rbitration is not a substitute for judicial adjudication, but a
method of resolving disputes over matters which, except for the collective agreement and its grievance machinery, would be subject to no
governing adjudicative principle at all .... [G]rievance arbitration is
not quite the same thing as adjudication .... [P]arties to the collective
bargaining process have substituted for the strike, as a method of
resolving differences between them as to the proper application and
interpretation of their agreement, a system of adjudication against the
standards set forth in that agreement; but that system of adjudication,
since it is not a substitute for litigation, is not the same, in principle,
historical background, or effect, as the system of adjudication used by
the courts 2to resolve controversies over the meaning and application of
contracts. '
[The arbitrator] is not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties
by superior authority which the parties are obliged to accept. He has
no general charter to administer justice for a community which tran18. See Cooper, Discovery in Labor Arbitration, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1988).
19. In a recent survey of representative bargaining agreements, grievance procedures culminating in binding arbitration were found in 98% of the contracts. See Basic Patterns: Grievances and
Arbitration, 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (B.N.A.) 51:1 (1989).
See also U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2095, CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 112 (1981) (indicating that 97% of 1,550

major collective bargaining agreements reviewed contained arbitration provisions).
20. Gregory, Enforcement of Collective Agreements by Arbitration, 48 VA. L. REV. 883, 892
(1962). See P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING VIEW 111 (1966).
21. Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration'sGolden Age, 29 NAT'L ACAD. ARBS. 97, 100-01
(1976). See Feller, A General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663,
704-05, 742 (1973); Goldberg, A Supreme Court Justice Looks at Arbitration, 20 ARB. J. 13, 14
(1965).
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scends the parties. He is rather part of a system of self-government

created by and confined to the parties. He serves their pleasure only,
to administer the rule of law established by their collective
agreement. 22

The Warrior & Gulf Court appropriately accepted the view that
grievance-arbitration is more analogous to the bargaining process than to
the quasi-judicial function. It noted that "[t]he grievance procedure is
... a part of the continuous collective bargaining process" and indicated
'2 3
that "[iut, rather than a strike, is the terminal point of a disagreement.
The Court further emphasized that labor arbitration involves more than
the quasi-judicial interpretation and application of express contractual
provisions.
Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding
a system of private law for all the problems which may arise and to
provide for their solution in a way which will generally accord with the
variant needs and desires of the parties. The processing of disputes
through the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which mean24
ing and content are given to the collective bargaining agreement.
If grievance arbitration were considered quasi-judicial in nature, the
neutral arbiters would merely perform functions similar to those performed by traditional judges. The parties would be expected to present
cases in a relatively formal and legalistic manner. Arbitrators would be
expected to interpret and apply contractual language the same way in
which judges interpret and apply statutory provisions. Judges would be
fully conversant with the function being performed by arbitrators and
would feel wholly competent to determine whether such neutrals have
performed their assigned tasks in a judicial fashion. Such an approach
would undermine the grievance-arbitration process by depriving the contractual parties of their fundamental bargain.
Labor and management representatives generally provide that all
disputes regarding the interpretation and application of bargaining agreement terms should be finally resolved through the specified grievancearbitration procedures. Grievance-arbitration procedures are a substitute for both economic warfare and judicial action. Negotiating parties
22. Shulman, supra note 10, at 1016, 1024.
23. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960). See
NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967), wherein the Court held that an employer's
statutory duty to bargain includes the obligation to provide representative labor organizations with
the information they need to administer bargaining agreements through grievance-arbitration procedures. See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-91 (1967) (labor organization owes bargaining unit
employees duty of fair representation when making decisions concerning processing of grievances);
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 567-69 (1976) (labor organization owes grievants duty of fair representation when preparing and presenting their arbitration cases).
24. 363 U.S. at 581.
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appreciate the fact that their contractual provisions are not always unambiguous. 25 The negotiating parties also recognize that the express terms
of their collective contract do not encompass every enforceable condition
of employment. 26 They thus adopt grievance-arbitration mechanisms to
provide a means of fleshing out the gaps in their agreement and determining the manner of application for any ambiguous language in their
agreement. As Professor Theodore St. Antoine has insightfully noted,
such contracting parties have elected to have grievance arbitrators act as
'27
their designated "contract readers."
If unresolved grievances were allowed to fester, employee morale
would decline, and the likelihood of industrial self-help would increase.
Grievance-arbitration procedures enable contracting parties to resolve
their bargaining agreement disputes in an informal, inexpensive, and relatively expeditious manner. Both sides are given the opportunity to articulate their respective positions, and the arbitrator is expected to
resolve their controversy. It is often less important whether or not the
arbitrator reaches the "correct" result, than it is that he or she achieve
some solution. Such a denouement enables the parties to move on to
other matters. The arbitral determination alleviates the tension associated with unresolved disputes. An arbitral determination also permits
the unsuccessful participant to impose blame for the result on an outside
individual, instead of the other member of the continuing labor-management relationship. If the losing party is truly dissatisfied with the arbitral
determination, it can always seek a modification of that interpretation
when the next collective contract is negotiated.
Some writers have suggested that employers and labor organizations
prefer to have their contractual disputes resolved by labor arbitrators,
because such neutrals are particularly knowledgeable about labor-management relations and the industrial law of the shop. 28 Other writers
have been less generous, however, indicating that most labor arbitrators
are marginally competent, at best, and are more desirous of guaranteeing
future acceptability than of deciding issues in a wholly objective manner. 29 Although I accept the notion that most labor arbitrators do pos25. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
26. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
27. See St. Antoine, JudicialReview of Labor ArbitrationAwardr A Second Look at Enterprise
Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1977).
28. See Jones, "His Own Brand of IndustrialJustice'" The Stalking Horse of JudicialReview of
Labor Arbitration, 30 UCLA L. REV. 881, 883-84 (1983); Wallen, Recent Supreme Court Decisions
on Arbitration: An Arbitrator's View, 63 W. VA. L. REV. 295, 296-97 (1961); Wellington, Judicial
Review of the Promise to Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 471, 479-80 (1962).
29. See P. HAYS, supra note 20, at 111-12.
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sess a greater understanding of industrial relations than people
unfamiliar with such unique settings, the issue of arbitral competence is
not very significant. The parties who select arbitrators-usually from
lists provided by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service or the
American Arbitration Association-are generally familiar with their respective backgrounds and arbitral records. If such parties wish to employ experienced persons, they may certainly do so. If, however, they
prefer to retain the services of neophytes, that too is their prerogative.
Regardless of how professionally capable a particular arbitrator may
be, he or she will normally issue a decision which resolves the underlying
controversy. The finality aspect is an important feature of the arbitration
process.
The parties' stake in arbitral finality .

exists not so much be-

cause the arbitrator has special competence, experience, or understanding... Instead, the parties have an institutional stake in finality
because the arbitrator is their creation; he functions by their consent
and at their sufferance, and his powers and30roles can and should be
molded by them to suit their own purposes.
If losing parties regularly appealed arbitral determinations to state or
federal courts, this fundamental aspect of arbitral decisionmaking would
be lost. If judges mistakenly considered arbitration decisions analogous
to judicial determinations and subjected those awards to searching review, the party that prevailed before the arbitrator would be deprived of
its bargain, and labor-management relations would be adversely affected.
This article will evaluate the way in which courts and the NLRB
should treat grievance arbitration decisions, based upon the premise that
such determinations should be considered an integral part of the collective bargaining process. The article will initially assess the manner in
which pre-hearing challenges to arbitral jurisdiction should be resolved.
It will next analyze the appropriate judicial function with respect to postarbitration judicial review, to contemplate how reviewing courts should
evaluate arbitral fact-finding and interpretative determinations and resolve challenges to arbitration awards based upon public policy considerations. The relationship between the NLRB authority and arbitral
jurisdiction will then be explored, to decide when the Labor Board
should direct parties to resolve unfair labor practice allegations through
arbitral proceedings, and the degree of deference the NLRB should accord to prior arbitral determinations. The article will finally discuss the
30. Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 267, 275 (1980). See Bedikian, Riding on the Horns of a Dilemma: The Law of Contract v.
Public Policy in the Enforcement of Labor Arbitral Awards, 1988 DET. C.L. REV. 693, 694 (1988);
Ashe, Arbitration Finality: Myth or Reality?, 38 ARB. J., No. 4, 42 (Dec., 1983).
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way in which contracting parties and arbitrators should modify their behavior to guarantee that arbitral proceedings will optimally enhance labor-management relationships.
II.

PRE-ARBITRATION JUDICIAL INTERVENTION

Labor and management representatives are able to resolve most contractual disputes during the pre-arbitration stages of the grievance procedure. In those relatively infrequent instances in which they are unable to
achieve an amicable solution and the moving party continues to feel sufficiently aggrieved, arbitration may be invoked. In most cases involving
resort to the ultimate step of the grievance-arbitration machinery, the
parties simply select an arbitrator and schedule the requisite hearing. If
the responding party believes that the grievance is not arbitrable, it generally submits to the arbitrator's authority and raises the jurisdictional
issue before that neutral authority. 3 1 In a few cases, however, the responding party does not voluntarily participate in the requested arbitral
proceeding. The responding party may instead seek a declaratory judgment from a state 32 or federal court finding that the particular controversy is not subject to arbitral jurisdiction. The reluctant entity may
alternatively refuse to submit to the arbitrator's authority, forcing the
grieving party to seek a state or federal court injunction33 directing the
recalcitrant entity to arbitrate the underlying contractual dispute.
Prior to 1960, state courts had not been very supportive of grievance-arbitration provisions. State courts frequently indicated an unwillingness to enforce executory promises to arbitrate future contractual
disputes which might arise.3 4 Even when state courts were willing to
enforce such executory commitments, they often did so reluctantly. For
example, in InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Cuttler-Hammer,
31. See Jones, The Name of the Game is Decision--Some Reflections on "Arbitrability" and
"Authority" in Labor Arbitration, 46 TEX. L. REV. 865, 866 (1968); Smith & Jones, The Impact of
the Emerging Federal Law of Grievance Arbitration on Judges Arbitrators and Parties, 52 VA. L.
REV. 831, 871 (1966).
32. State courts possess jurisdiction concurrent with federal district courts over suits under
§ 301 of the LMRA, but state tribunals are required to apply federal substantive law to such actions.
See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). Such federal question suits may be
removed from state to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982). See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge
No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
33. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the Supreme Court held
that the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1982), do
not deprive federal courts of authority to issue injunctive orders in favor of arbitration, since such
judicial orders were "not a part and parcel of the abuses against which the [Norris-LaGuardia] Act
was aimed." Id. at 458.
34. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 39-40 (4th ed. 1985); D.
ROTHSCHILD, L. MERRIFIELD & C. CRAVER, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION 273-75 (3d ed. 1988).
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Inc., 35 the court held that a judge must initially review the pertinent contractual language and determine whether the parties had actually intended their arbitration clause to cover the existing controversy.
Whenever a court concluded that the grieving party could not prevail on
the merits of the dispute, it refused to order arbitration. "If the meaning
of the provision of the contract sought to be arbitrated is beyond dispute,
there cannot be anything to arbitrate and the contract cannot be said to
' 36
provide for arbitration.
In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 3 7 the
United States Supreme Court rejected the traditional common-law approach. Since the Warrior & Gulf Court recognized that grievance arbitration is "part and parcel" of the bargaining process,3 8 it decided that
the role of judges confronting arbitrability issues should be highly circumscribed. Although the Court acknowledged that "arbitration is a
matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit," the Court emphasized the "congressional policy in favor of settlement of disputes by
the parties through the machinery of arbitration. . . -39 The Supreme
Court thus delineated an extremely narrow function for courts asked to
determine pre-arbitration questions concerning arbitral jurisdiction:
[T]he judicial inquiry under § 301 must be strictly confined to the
question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance... An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be
denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage ....
[I]n the absence of any express provision excluding a particular
grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of
a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail .... 40
In the companion case of United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 41 the Court expressly repudiated the Cuttler-Hammer doctrine and stressed that courts are not to weigh the merits of particular
42
disputes when determining the arbitrability of such controversies.
The function of the court is very limited when the parties have
agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitra35. 271 A.D. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1947) (per curiam), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464
(1947) (per curiam).
36. 271 A.D. at 918, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
37. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
38. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
39. 363 U.S. at 582.
40. 363 U.S. at 582-83, 584-85.
41. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
42. Id. at 567.
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tor. It is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration
is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract.
Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract
interpretation for the arbitrator ....
The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits of the
grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or
determining whether there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim. The agreement is to submit all
grievances to arbitration, not merely those which the court will deem
meritorious. The processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values of which those 43
who are not a part of the plant environment may be quite unaware.

The Warrior & Gulf Court also indicated that grieving parties need
not always rely upon explicit contractual language to support their arbitrability contentions.
The labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the express
provisions of the contract, as the industrial common law-the practices of the industry and the shop--is equally a part of the collective
bargaining agreement although not expressed in it. The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal
judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in
the contract as criteria for judgment. The parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance will reflect not only what the contract
says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement permits, such
factors as the effect upon productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the morale of the shop, [and] his judgment whether tensions
will be heightened or diminished . . . . The ablest judge cannot be
expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear upon
the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly
informed. 44
The Warrior & Gulf and American Manufacturing decisions clearly
recognized that courts should rarely permit pre-arbitration judicial intervention to preclude arbitral consideration of contractual grievances. In
such situations, judges are merely to ask whether the underlying controversy is even "arguably" subject to the scope of the grievance-arbitration
provisions. Only when the resisting party can unequivocally demonstrate that the contracting parties definitely intended to exclude such issues from arbitral jurisdiction may a judge decline to sanction
arbitration. 45 All doubts must be resolved in favor of arbitration.
43. Id. at 567-68.
44. Id. at 581-82.
45. See, e.g., Smith & Jones, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging
Federal Law, 63 MICH. L. REV. 751, 786 (1965); Sipser, Arbitration and the Courts: Arbitrability,
Forum Shopping, and Public Policy, 16 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. (1964); Gregory, Enforcement of Collective Agreements By Arbitration, 48 VA. L. REV. 883, 888-89 (1962).
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Several years after the Warrior& Gulf and American Manufacturing
cases, the Supreme Court delineated a crucial distinction between substantive and procedural arbitrability challenges. In John Wiley & Sons v.
Livingston,46 the Court limited the Warrior & Gulf/American Manufacturing evaluative criteria to substantive arbitrability questions. Since the
court recognized that procedural arbitrability claims frequently raise equitable issues that are particularly suited to arbitral determination, and
that are often inextricably intertwined with the merits of the underlying
contractual dispute, the Court decided that such procedural matters
should be left to arbitral resolution.
Doubt whether grievance procedures .

.

. have been followed or

excused, or whether the unexcused failure to follow them avoids the
duty to arbitrate cannot ordinarily be answered without consideration
of the merits of the dispute which is presented for arbitration ....
Once it is determined ...that the parties are obligated to submit

the subject matter of a dispute to arbitration, "procedural" questions
which grow out of the dispute
and bear on its final disposition should
47
be left to the arbitrator.
The Warrior& Gulf/American Manufacturingpresumption in favor
of arbitrability has had a salutary effect upon grievance arbitration.
Since employers and labor organizations realize that courts will almost
always conclude that contractual disputes are arbitrable-no matter how
frivolous cases may appear on the merits-parties generally recognize
that they should simply present their arbitrability claims and their substantive contentions to the arbitrators. In a recent study of all reported
federal court cases from 1960 through the end of 1988 pertaining to
grievance arbitration litigation, Professors Peter Feuille and Michael LeRoy found only 143 district court decisions involving pre-arbitration judicial intervention. 48 Feuille and LeRoy were thus able to locate only 5.1
pre-arbitration federal court cases per year during that twenty-eight year
period. Of the 136 district court decisions which actually resolved the
arbitrability question, 103 (76%) culminated in judicial orders directing
arbitration. 49 In only thirty-three instances-slightly more than one case
per year-did district courts decline to compel arbitration.5 0 When one
recognizes that thousands of contractual disputes were taken to arbitra46. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
47. Id. at 557. See also Operating Engineers v. Flair Builders, Inc., 406 U.S. 487, 490-92 (1972)
(the Supreme Court reaffirmed the John Wiley & Sons view that procedural arbitrability questions
should be resolved by arbitrators and not judges).
48. See Feuille & LeRoy, Grievance Arbitration Appeals in the Federal Courts: Facts and
Figures, 45 ARB. J., No. 1, 35, 39 (Mar., 1990).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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tion during those twenty-eight years, 5 ' it becomes apparent that the
Supreme Court approach has encouraged parties to conclude their bargaining process with respect to contractual disputes in the arbitral forum,
instead of through resort to judicial intervention.
In AT & T Technologies v. Communication Workers,52 the Supreme
Court expressly reaffirmed the Warrior& Gulf/American Manufacturing
arbitrability approach. 53 The Court, nonetheless, went on to suggest a
more intrusive role for courts confronting arbitrability challenges.
[T]he question of arbitrability-whether a collective-bargaining
agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular
grievance-is undeniably an issue for judicial determination. Unless
the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court,
not the arbitrator...
The duty to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory
submission to arbitration cannot precede judicial determination that
54
the collective bargaining agreement does in fact create such a duty.
Under the Warrior & Gulf/American Manufacturing formulation,
judges deciding arbitrability challenges should merely determine if the
underlying contractual dispute is "arguably" subject to the grievancearbitration provisions. 55 All doubts must be resolved in favor of arbitration. Under the AT & T Technologies approach, one has reason to believe that district court judges may become more enmeshed in the
validity of the underlying controversies. While endeavoring to assess
arbitrability, the judges may be tempted to examine contractual language, bargaining history, and even past practice. Such conduct would
be entirely inappropriate.
The more intrusive AT&T Technologies approach was evident in the
recent Litton FinancialPrinting v. NLRB decison. 56 Litton Financialinvolved a bargaining agreement containing a broad grievance-arbitration
provision and a clause specifying that in the case of layoffs, seniority
would be the determining factor "if other things such as aptitude and
ability [were] equal." The contract expired in October of 1979. No new
agreement had been achieved when, in August and September of 1980,
Litton Financial unilaterally modified its operations and laid off ten
51. See id. at 41 (Table 1).
52. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
53. See 475 U.S. at 648-50.
54. Id. at 649. The Court reiterated the fact that courts are not to review the merits of grievances in the guise of deciding arbitrability, since the merits of disputes are always for the arbitrators
to determine. Id. at 649-50.

55. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
56. 111 S. Ct. 2215 (1991).
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workers, including six of the most senior employees. Litton Financial
refused to process grievences filed by the union, and a section 8(a)(5)
refusal to bargain charge 57 was filed with the NLRB. The Labor Board
held that the unilaterial changes contravened section 8(a)(5), since Litton
Financial had failed to provide the union with the opportunity to discuse
the proposed modifications. The Board directed Litton Financial to bargain with the union over the layoffs and to process the grievances. It
refused, however, to order arbitration, since it concluded that the grievances did not arise under the expired contract. A five-Justice majority
sustained the Board determiniation.
The Litton Financial majority erroneously permitted the Labor
Board to substitute its interpretation of the bargaining agreement for that
of the arbitrator. It also ignored its prior holding in Nolde Bros., Inc. v.
Bakery Workers,58 in which it has directed an employer to arbitrate employee claims to severance pay with respect to layoffs that had occured
after the existing collective contract had expired.
The dispute.., although arising after the expiration of the collectivebargaining contract, clearly arises under that contract.... [T]here is
nothing in the arbitration clause that expressly excludes from its operation a dispute which arises under the contract, but which is based on
events that occur after its termination... By their contract, the parties
clearly expressed their preference for an arbitral, rather than a judicial
interpretation of their obligations under the collective-bargaining
agreement. 59
In Litton Financial, both the NLRB and the Supreme Court majority
disreguarded the crucial fact that an order directing arbitration would
not necessarily have indicated that the seniority rights in question had
survived expiration of the bargaining agreement. Since the Board had
found that the grievance procedures had survived the expiration of the
contract, it should have directed arbitration of the seniority dispute.
While an arbitrator may have determined that the seniority rights did not
survive expiration of the agreement, he or she may have found a sufficiently established past practice of applying those rights to periods between contracts to create an enforceable contractual term. It should
have been obvious that the union claims arose under the pertinent bargaining agreement. The grievances relied upon a specific contractual
provision. The Board and the Court should have left it to the arbitrator
to decide whether the grievant's seniority rights had survived the expiration of the bargaining agreement.
57. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
58. 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
59. 430 U.S. at 249, 253 (emphasis in original).
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Grievance-arbitration clauses generally provide that all controversies, with respect to the interpretation and application of bargaining
agreement terms, will be resolved exclusively through the specified contractual procedures. If one views such dispute-resolution machinery as a
continuation of the collective bargaining process, it becomes clear that
judicial intervention can accomplish nothing but mischief. At best, such
pre-arbitration intervention will significantly delay submission of the underlying contract dispute to arbitration. At worst, pre-arbitration intervention might deprive a labor organization, or an employer, of a hearing
before the tribunal which the parties specified would resolve all of their
contractual disagreements.
Courts should realize that pre-arbitration litigation always involves
a party that has refused to honor its contractual commitment to the
grievance-arbitration process. Either one party is seeking a judicial declaration that it is not obliged to arbitrate a particular question, or the
moving party is being compelled to seek injunctive relief against a responding entity that has declined to participate voluntarily in an arbitral
proceeding. In either instance, the reluctant party could adequately protect its interests by simply submitting to the arbitrator's authority and
raising the arbitrability issue before that individual. If the grievance is
actually not arbitrable, the neutral person should dispose of the case on
that narrow basis. In those rare instances in which the arbitrator rules in
favor of arbitrability, when it should be obvious to all unbiased observers
that the parties specifically intended to exclude such controversies from
arbitral consideration, post-arbitration judicial review would be available
to correct the error. 60
Since the AT & T Technologies decision, most lower courts have
continued to apply the Warrior & Gulf/American Manufacturing presumption in favor of arbitrability. When the pertinent contractual language is ambiguous, and it is not abundantly apparent that the parties
intended to exclude the particular grievance from arbitral consideration,
courts continue to rule in favor of arbitral jurisdiction. 6' Even cases in
which employers have alleged that the individual grievants were not bar60. If a party challenging arbitrability of the underlying grievance unsuccessfully presents its
jurisdictional objection to the arbitrator, it may thereafter request judicial review of that arbitral
determination. See IAM Lodge 1777 v. Fansteel, Inc., 900 F.2d 1005, 1008-10 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 143 (1990).

61. See, e.g., E.M. Diagnostic v. Local 169, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 812 F.2d 91, 95-97
(3d Cir. 1987); Local Union 453, IBEW v. Independent Broadcasting Co., 849 F.2d 328, 330-31 (8th
Cir. 1988); Winery Workers Union, Local 186 v. E & J Gallo Winery, Inc., 857 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th
Cir. 1988); Oil Workers' Int'l Union, Local 4-447 v. Chevron Chemical Co., 815 F.2d 338, 344 (5th
Cir. 1987).
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gaining unit "employees" covered by the grievance-arbitration procedures, judges have usually directed submission to arbitral authority. 62
Only on rare occasions have appellate courts misapplied the Warrior &
Gulf/American Manufacturing test.
Morristown Daily Record v. Graphic Communications Union, Local
8N 63 involved an employer that challenged the arbitrability of a grievance. Since the district court judge decided that the arbitrability question was inseparable from the merits of the underlying contractual
dispute, the judge directed the parties to present the entire case to the
arbitrator. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Instead of recognizing that the district judge had effectively and properly concluded
that the controversy was "arguably" arbitrable, the appellate court found
that A T & T Technologies obliged the district judge to make a more definitive arbitrability evaluation. That judicial official had to find whether
or not the grievance was actually arbitrable. The Third Circuit Court
did note, however, that the district court should only deny arbitral jurisdiction if "the company has produced strong and forceful evidence of the
parties' intention to remove the issue of status from the general arbitration clause." 64
In Teamsters Local 315 v. Union Oil Co. of California,65 the Ninth
Circuit Court went well beyond the bounds of judicial authority. While
reversing a district court finding in favor of arbitrability, the court of
appeals relied upon the contractual language and the bargaining history
to support its conclusion that the parties had no intent to submit such
grievances to arbitration.66 When arbitrability decisions cannot be definitively made, without such an intrusive examination of the operative contract provisions and the bargaining history, the dispute should be
referred to the arbitrator. Such industrial relations experts are especially
well-suited to interpret bargaining agreement provisions, and the nuances
associated with bargaining history. By directing the district court to engage in such a searching process, the Ninth Circuit Court usurped arbi62. See, e.g., Communication Workers of Am. v. US West Direct, 847 F.2d 1475, 1477-78 (10th
Cir. 1988); CWA v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 820 F.2d 189, 193 (6th Cir. 1987). But cf. Construction Workers, Local 682 v. Bussen Quarries, Inc., 849 F.2d 1123, 1124-25 (8th Cir. 1988) (issue
whether certain owner-operator truck drivers constituted "employees" covered by bargaining agreement was representation question within exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB). See also United Food
& Commercial Workers, Local 7 v. Gold Star Sausage Co., 897 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1990); Local
106, Service Employees Int'l Union v. Homewood Memorial Gardens, Inc., 838 F.2d 958 (7th Cir.
1988) (correctly indicating that rights which did not vest or accrue during the term of contract are
not subject to arbitration after agreement has expired).
63. 832 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1987).
64. Id. at 35.
65. 856 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 869 (1989).
66. See 856 F.2d at 1310-14.
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tral authority and deprived the labor organization of its contractual right
to have disputes resolved through the grievance-arbitration procedures.
Appellate courts continue to acknowledge that procedural arbitrability questions are generally to be determined by arbitrators, not
judges. 67 They appropriately realize that a labor organization's failure to
satisfy a specified time limit may be excused for various reasons. The
grievant or union representative may have been induced to delay processing of a formal grievance by managerial representations that the matter
would be resolved. The parties may not have followed their stated limitations in prior cases, thus waiving compliance with those rules. Such
procedural issues involve equitable considerations that are optimally left
to arbitral determination. GeneralDrivers, Local Union 89 v. Moog Louisville Warehouse 68 provides a perfect example of judicial overreaching.
The Sixth Circuit Court reversed the district court's decision to have a
timeliness issue resolved by the arbitrator, and substituted its own conclusion that the discharge grievance had not been filed on time. The
court clearly ignored the John Wiley & Sons edict 6 9 to have such procedural questions decided by the arbitrator.
Courts have generally limited pre-arbitration intervention to those
few cases in which the recalcitrant party could demonstrate that the contracting parties unequivocally intended to exclude the particular grievance from the scope of the grievance-arbitration procedures. Such
judicial respect for the Warrior & Gulf/American Manufacturing presumption in favor of arbitrability has appropriately enhanced the bargaining process.
This presumption of arbitrability for labor disputes recognizes the
greater institutional competence of arbitrators in interpreting collective-bargaining agreements, "furthers the national labor policy of
peaceful resolution of labor disputes and thus best accords with
'70 the
parties' presumed objectives in pursuing collective bargaining."
67. See, e.g., Oil Workers' Int'l Union, Local 4-447 v. Chevron Chemical Co., 815 F.2d 338,
341-42 (5th Cir. 1987); Automotive Industries Employees Union, Local 618 v. Town & Country
Ford, 709 F.2d 509, 511-14 (8th Cir. 1983).
68. 852 F.2d 871, 873-75 (6th Cir. 1988).
69. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
70. AT & T Technologies v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (quoting
Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466 U.S. 364, 371-72 (1984)).
Even when a court rejects a pre-arbitration challenge to arbitral authority and orders the parties
to submit their controversy to arbitral procedures, the arbitrator should be able to consider the
arbitrability question more fully. The court in such a situation is merely required to determine
whether the underlying dispute is "arguably" arbitrable, with doubts being resolved in favor of arbitral jurisdiction. Such a preliminary finding should not deprive the arbitrator of the right to decide
on the merits that the contracting parties actually intended to exclude the instant issue from arbitral
consideration. See Gould, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards-Thirty Years of the Steel-
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III.

POST-ARBITRATION JUDICIAL REVIEW

In 1956, Professor Cox sagely noted that "[t]he principles determining legal rights and duties under a collective bargaining agreement
should not be imposed from above; they should be drawn out of the institutions of labor relations and shaped to their yneeds."17 1 Parties to collective bargaining agreements typically provide that all disputes concerning
the interpretation and application of contractual terms shall be finally
and exclusively resolved through the grievance-arbitration procedures.
Although the parties recognize that arbitrators will not always reach perfect decisions, they acknowledge the need to have existing controversies
resolved expeditiously and with minimal disruption to the basic labormanagement relationship.
Courts asked to review labor arbitration awards "have shown an
72
ingrained reluctance to defer to awards they felt to be unfair or wrong."
When judges decide to negate arbitral determinations, they disrupt the
collective bargaining process, and deprive the parties of the finality they
specified in their grievance-arbitration provisions.
[W]hen the losing party in arbitration asks a court not to give
effect to an award, it is asking that the conclusiveness which is at the
heart of the process be withheld. The core considerations seem clear.
First, the parties have contracted for a final and binding award; the
party who resists adherence to it is therefore seeking to be relieved of
his bargain. Second, whether judicial intercession results in enforcement or vacation of the award, expediency in the resolution of the dispute is lost. Finally .... an employer's resistance to compliance with
the award .... may
also encourage strike action by the union to press
73
for enforcement.

Judges who are asked to review grievance-arbitration decisions must
realize that "the parties freely agreed to give up some accuracy in arbitration awards in exchange for greater efficiency." ' 74 Courts should especially appreciate that "the greater good is sometimes served by making
certain classes of decisions final and ending litigation, even though in a
particular case the individual is prevented by review from correcting
workers Trilogy: The Aftermath of AT & T and Misco, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 464, 479-81
(1989); Jones, supra note 31, at 880-81.
71. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601, 605 (1956).
72. Note, The Public Policy Exception to Judicial Deferralof Labor Arbitration Awards-How
Far Should Expansion Go?, 39 S.C.L. REV. 465, 466 (1988).
73. Note, Judicial Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Problems ofPower and Finality, 23 UCLA L. REV. 936, 949 (1976).
74. Bornong, Judicial Review By Sense of Smell: Practical Application of the Steelworkers Essence Test in Labor Arbitration Appeals, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 643, 659 (1988).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:571

some error which has injured him." '7 5
Judicial concern that parties adversely affected by questionable arbitral decisions may be hesitant to accept grievance-arbitration procedures
in the future is unfounded, "because the collective bargaining process is
uniquely qualified to suffer and absorb the most outrageous errors by
arbitrators. '7 6 If the losing party is dissatisfied with an arbitral award, it
may easily act to protect its interests.
If the arbitrator errs and one of the parties loses confidence in
him, he is readily expendable. The error itself is not immutable and
can be corrected at the next negotiation of the agreement or sooner
77

If reviewing courts provide losing parties with the least encouragement to ignore the finality of labor arbitration decisions, the negative
consequences for harmonious labor-management relations would be significant. It can easily take a year or more to obtain a district court decision with respect to a challenged arbitral award, and an additional year
may be expended if appellate court review is thereafter sought. 78
[E]ven if the outcome of'judicial intercession is enforcement of the
award, litigation is of itself damaging to the values the award is
designed to serve. Resort to litigation is inconsistent with the genius of
arbitration as an essentially autonomous system of self-government
which draws its sustenance
from the parties' self-determined voluntary
79
commitment to it.
Judicial recognition of the fact that grievance-arbitration procedures
constitute an extension of the collective bargaining process should encourage courts to restrict their review of arbitral awards. Judges would
be extremely reluctant to void a particular contract term formulated by
negotiating parties-unless that provision clearly contravened applicable
law. The Courts should exercise similar restraint with respect to interpretative decisions by labor arbitrators who are merely endeavoring to
discern how the contracting parties must have intended to deal with the
issues raised by the grievances before them. Only in situations involving
egregious arbitral misconduct should post-award judicial intervention be
available.
75. Dunau, Scope of Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards in 24 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB.
175, 176 (1972) (quoting Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 148 (1922)).
76. Bornong, supra note 74, at 660.
77. Dunau, supra note 75, at 219. See Aaron, JudicialIntervention in Labor Arbitration, 20
STAN. L. REV. 41, 51-52 (1967) ("A party dissatisfied with an award can always seek to undo its
effect at the next negotiation, and in the rare but not-unheard-of situation in which both sides are
dissatisfied with an award, they may mutually agree to disregard it.").
78. See Hexter, JudicialReview of Labor Arbitration Awards: How the Public Policy Exception
Cases Ignore the Public Policies Underlying Labor Arbitration, 34 ST. Louis U.L.J. 77, 104 (1989).
79. Dunau, supra note 75, at 177.
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The United States Arbitration Act 80 contains limited guidelines
which should be followed by judges asked to vacate labor arbitration
awards. Although section 1 of that enactment specifically provides that
"nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce," 8 1 several courts have concluded that the
section 1 exclusionary language was not designed to exempt collective
bargaining agreements.8 2 Others Courts have reached the opposite conclusion. 83 The Supreme Court recently intimated that the U.S. Arbitration Act does not apply to bargaining agreements.8 4 Even if Congress
did not intend the U.S. Arbitration Act to be applied to bargaining agreements,8 5 it would be entirely appropriate for courts to adopt the Arbitration Act's standards, as part of the federal common law governing the
enforcement of labor arbitration determinations under section 301 of the
LMRA.8 6 Section 10 of that enactment sets forth limited guidelines
which should be followed by judges asked to vacate labor arbitration
decisions.
[A court] may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced.
80. 9 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1982).

81. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
82. See, e.g., Pietro Scalzitti Co. v. Operating Engineers, 351 F.2d 576, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1965);
Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Electrical Workers, 235 F.2d 298, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957); Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters Local 327, 217 F.2d 49, 53
(6th Cir. 1954).

83. See, e-g., American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 823 F.2d 466,
471-73 (1 1th Cir. 1987); Derwin v. General Dynamics Corp., 719 F.2d 484, 488 (1st Cir. 1983);

United Electrical Workers v. Miller Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954).
84. See Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 40-41 n.9 (1987).
85. "mhe position that collective bargaining agreements are not 'contracts of employment' within the meaning of the exclusionary language of the USAA was a distinctly minority view even prior to Lincoln Mills, and it cannot be cited with any confidence as the
current view of any of the federal courts of appeals."
American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 823 F.2d 466, 473 (11 th Cir.
1987). See United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 7R v. Safeway, 889 F.2d 940, 943-44 (10th
Cir. 1989).
86. See Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 40 n.9 (1987); Derwin v. General Dynamics
Corp., 719 F.2d 484, 488 n.4 (1st Cir. 1983).
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(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final,8 7and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.
It should be obvious that no arbitral award "procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means" or issued by an arbitrator who demonstrated "evident partiality or corruption" should be judicially
sustained.8 8 Similarly, where the record clearly indicates that the arbitrator has capriciously refused to postpone a hearing or has improperly
declined to hear relevant evidence, and such action has caused demonstrable prejudice to a party, the resulting decision should not be enforced.
Judges should be especially circumspect with respect to cases in
which it is alleged that arbitrators "exceeded their powers" or "imperfectly executed them." Only when it is unequivocally established that an
arbitrator has issued a decision wholly beyond the specific authority delineated in the grievance-arbitration provisions, should a court refuse enforcement.8 9 In those rare instances in which a court finds that an
arbitrator has "imperfectly executed" his or her powers, the appropriate
course would be to remand the controversy to the arbitrator for further
proceedings. 90 A judge should not simply "correct" the arbitral award,
since the parties have contractually bound themselves to a final resolution by their privately designated neutral.
Courts should almost never overturn a grievance arbitrator's factual
determinations. "The parties did not bargain for the facts to be found by
a court, but by an arbitrator chosen by them who had more opportunity
to observe [the witnesses] and to be familiar with the plant and its
problems." 91 So long as there is any evidence to support the arbitrator's
factual conclusions, the decision should be given judicial respect.
In Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc.,92 the Supreme Court emphasized
that judges "do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an
arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower
courts."'9 3 State and federal judges asked to vacate arbitral awards
87. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982). See generally Ray, Court Review of Labor Arbitration Awards Under
the Federal Arbitration Act, 32 VILL. L. REV. 57 (1987); Note, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration
Awards: Refining the Standard of Review, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 993, 1006-15 (1985).
88. See, e.g., Pac. & Artic Ry. and Navigation Co. v. United Transp. Union, 952 F.2d 1144 (9th
Cir. 1991).
89. See infra Part III(A) and accompanying discussion in text.
90. See, e.g., United Steelworkers, Local 4839 v. New Idea Farm, 917 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir.
1990).
91. Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 45 (1987). See Tanoma Mining Co. v. Local
Union 1269, UMWA, 896 F.2d 745, 747-48 (3d Cir. 1990); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Great
Western Food Co., 712 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1983).
92. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
93. Id. at 38.
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should recognize that the judicial system is not responsible for questionable arbitral determinations. Courts are not asked to place a judicial imprimatur on such decisions. The Courts' function is much more limited.
The parties and the arbitrator are the ones who must accept responsibility for arbitral awards which constitute an integral part of the "system of
self-government created by and confined to the parties." 94 Courts that
enforce arbitral determinations merely direct the contracting parties to
honor the results of their own private, dispute-resolution machinery.
While the judicial confirmation of such awards has significance for the
litigants themselves, it has no precedential effect with respect to future
court cases.
A.

JudicialReview of ContractualInterpretations

In 1959, Professor Cox recognized the dilemma facing federal courts
asked to review the propriety of grievance-arbitration determinations.
[S]ection 301 and the Lincoln Mills case have given the federal
courts power to shape the fate of grievance arbitration. They may
strengthen the institution by putting the force of law behind the arbitration clause and the ultimate award. They may shrivel and distort it
by excessive intervention.95
The following year, the Supreme Court decided to formulate a narrow
standard of judicial review that would encourage labor and management
reliance on the arbitration process.
In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,96 the Court
properly acknowledged that expansive judicial review of labor arbitration
awards would negate the promise of the negotiating parties to resolve
their contractual disputes exclusively and finally through their specified
97
grievance-arbitration procedures.
It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and so
far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract,
the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation
of the contract is different from his. 98
The Enterprise Wheel & Car Court expressly ruled that judges are
not empowered to reevaluate the merits of arbitral determinations.99
When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the
94. Shulman, supra note 10, at 1016. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
95. Cox, supra note 11, at 1487.
96. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
97. Id. at 599.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 596.
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collective bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment
to bear in order to reach a fair resolution of a problem .... Nevertheless, an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own
brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from
many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no
choice but to refuse enforcement of the award. 100
The Supreme Court thus recognized that reviewing courts should
give substantial deference to arbitral determinations. So long as such decisions "draw their essence" from the applicable collective contract, they
are entitled to enforcement, even when judges wholly disagree with the
interpretive analyses set forth in the awards.' 0 1 The approach appropriately acknowledged the crucial fact that arbitrators are not performing a
quasi-judicial function. The arbitrators are performing tasks that are
part of the collective bargaining process itself.
[I]t is important to draw a sharp distinction between the role of an
arbitrator in construing and applying the collective bargaining agreement and that of a court in enforcing a contract. The collective bargaining agreement is not a contract but an instrument of government,
and when the Supreme Court says that courts shouldn't review arbitrators' decisions, what it really is saying is that it is improper to judge an
arbitrator's performance in adjudicating disputes arising out of this
system of government by
the standards a court would use in judging a
10 2
breach-of-contract suit.

A more intrusive standard of judicial review would have the deleterious consequence of inducing arbitrators to prepare detailed and legalistic decisions to protect their awards from judicial reversal. 0 3 The
greater scrutiny would cause arbitral proceedings to become more formal, more time-consuming, and more expensive. To preclude such negative effects, the Enterprise Wheel & Car Court emphasized that
"[a]rbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an
award." ° 4 The Court further emphasized that "[a] mere ambiguity in
the opinion accompanying an award, which permits the inference that
the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is not a reason for refusing to enforce the award."' 0 5
100. Id. at 597.
101. Id. at 597-98; W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber Workers,
461 U.S. 757, 764-66 (1983).
102. Feller, supra note 21, at 103.
103. See Meltzer, RuminationsAbout Ideology, Law, and LaborArbitration, 34 U. CHi. L. REV.
545, 555 (1967).
104. 363 U.S. at 598.
105. Id.
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Only when it is unequivocally demonstrated that arbitrators have
exceeded their contractual authority should courts decline to enforce
their awards.1° 6 All doubts should be resolved in favor of enforcement.10 7 Even when arbitral awards are not based entirely upon express
contractual provisions, they may still be entitled to judicial respect. If
the arbitral awards are based upon the unwritten, common law of the
shop and they draw their essence from such established industrial policies, they should be enforced.
In the companion Warrior & Gulf case, the Supreme Court specifically recognized that the collective bargaining agreement is more than a
contract. "[I]t is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which
the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate."'' 0 8 The gaps in such "industrial
constitutions" are "to be filled in by reference to the practices of the particular industry and of the various shops covered by the agreement."' 9
Some reviewing courts ignore this critical distinction between commercial contracts and bargaining agreements, and the courts occasionally reject arbitral determinations that are based primarily upon past practices
or the common law of the shop." 0 Judges must realize that arbitral interpretations of established shop practices are entitled to as much judicial
deference as constructions of express provisions."'
In Paperworkersv. Misco, Inc.," t2 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
narrow Enterprise Wheel & Car standards of judicial review. It noted
that while "[t]he arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of the contract; . . . a court should not reject an award on the ground that the
arbitrator misread the contract."' '3 The Court further indicated that "as
long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his
106. See Note, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards After the Trilogy, 53 CORNELL L.
REV. 136, 142 (1967); Dunau, supra note 75, at 209.
107. Professor David Feller has even suggested that judges should provide arbitral determinations with respect analogous to that they give to the decisions of courts in other states, pursuant to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, (Article IV, Section 1). See
Feller, supra note 21, at 106-07.
108. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). See
supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
109. 363 U.S. at 580.
110. For an egregious example of overly intrusive judicial intervention, see Torrington Co. v.
Metal Products Workers, Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677, 680-82 (2d Cir. 1966) wherein the court failed
to resolve doubts in favor of enforcement and substituted its own interpretation of ambiguous circumstances for that of the designated arbitrator. See St. Antoine, supra note 27, at 1152-53.
111. See Kaden, supra note 30, at 295-96; St. Antoine, supra note 27, at 1146-48; Cox, supra
note 11, at 1499.
112. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
113. Id. at 38.
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decision." 114
The fact that judicial review is sought with respect to less than one
percent of private sector arbitral awards s certainly attests to the fact
that the limited availability of judicial review has beneficially encouraged
parties to comply voluntarily with even those arbitration decisions they
do not like. Courts should thus continue to affirm arbitral determinations, except in those extraordinary situations when it can be clearly
demonstrated that arbitrators have ignored unambiguous contractual
provisions or have acted wholly beyond the scope of their specified authority. Such judicial deference appropriately prevents "judicialization"
of the arbitration process." 6 Judicial deference also acknowledges the
important fact that the arbitrator is the parties' "officially designated
17
'reader' of the contract."''
[The arbitrator] is their joint alter ego for the purpose of striking
whatever supplementary bargain is necessary to handle the anticipated
unanticipated omissions of the initial agreement. Thus a "misinterpretation" or "gross mistake" by the arbitrator becomes a contradiction in
terms. In the absence of fraud or an overreaching of authority on the
part of the arbitrator, he is speaking for the parties, and his award is
their contract ....In sum, the arbitrator's award should be treated as
though it were a written stipulation by the parties setting forth their
own definitive construction of the labor contract. I8
Judicial review of arbitral awards is probably sought most frequently with respect to cases pertaining to disciplinary matters. The typical case involves an employer that has decided to suspend or terminate a
worker because of alleged misconduct. The arbitrator decides that the
employer has demonstrated the existence of "just cause" warranting
some discipline, but concludes that the penalty imposed was excessive.
In Enterprise Wheel & Car, the Supreme Court noted that it is particularly appropriate for arbitrators to utilize their "informed judgment ....
114. Id. See United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 7R v. Safeway, 889 F.2d 940, 946-47
(10th Cit. 1989); Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1205-09 (9th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 2205 (1990). The Misco Court also reiterated the view that
"grievance and arbitration procedures are part and parcel of the ongoing process of collective bargaining." 484 U.S. at 38.
115. See Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 48, at 42.
116. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. Grasselli Employees Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986). In those rare instances in which grievants' cases have been tainted
by the failure of their union agents to represent them fairly, courts may also vacate the resulting
arbitral decisions. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976). See generally Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 251 (1977).
117. St. Antoine, supra note 27, at 1140.
118. Id. See Heinsz, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Enterprise Wheel Goes
Around and Around, 52 Mo. L. REV. 243, 255 (1987).
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when it comes to formulating remedies."' 1 9 The Court emphasized that
while arbitrators do "not sit to dispense [their] own brand of industrial
justice .... [they] may.. . look for guidance from many sources, ... so
long as [their awards] draw [their] essence from the collective bargaining
agreement." 20
Employers which do not wish to have arbitrators evaluate the propriety of the disciplinary penalties they impose may seek contractual language expressly restricting the scope of arbitral authority. An illustrative
limitation of this variety might provide that "[s]hould it be determined
by the arbitrator that an employee has been suspended or discharged for
proper cause.... the arbitrator shall not have jurisdiction to modify the
degree of discipline imposed .... ,,121 When such restrictive language is
present, the arbitrator may determine whether "proper cause" for suspension or discharge has been established. The penalty imposed may not
22
be modified, unless the absence of "proper cause" is found.
Only when the relevant contractual language unambiguously restricts arbitral authority, with respect to the degree of punishment imposed, should courts decline to enforce arbitration decisions that modify
disciplinary penalties. For example, if a provision merely provides that
certain conduct is "considered cause for discharge," the arbitrator should
be the one to decide whether the parties actually intended that language
to preclude arbitral review of the penalty imposed for such behavior. In
S.D. Warren Co. v. United PaperworkersInt'l Union,123 the court inappropriately found that such a provision removed the penalty question
from arbitral jurisdiction. In doing so, the court effectively construed the
agreement language the parties selected the arbitrator to interpret. It
was perfectly reasonable for the arbitrator to find that such a clause was
not intended to restrict the usual arbitral authority to assess the severity
of the discipline imposed. Since the arbitrator had "arguably constru[ed]
or appl[ied] the contract and act[ed] within the scope of his authority," 24 the court should have deferred to the arbitrator's determination.
Courts occasionally permit loosely employed language in arbitration
opinions to provide a basis for overturning otherwise proper awards.
119. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
120. Id. See Local 120, Int'l Molders Union v. Brooks Foundry, 892 F.2d 1283, 1285-87 (6th
Cir. 1990). See also Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Arbitrability and Collective Bargaining, 28 U. CHI.
L. REv. 464, 484 (1961).

121. Container Products v. United Steelworkers, 873 F.2d 818, 818-19 (5th Cir. 1989).
122. 873 F.2d at 819. See IBEW, Local 429 v. Toshiba America, Inc., 879 F.2d 208, 210-11 (6th
Cir. 1989); Magnavox Co. v. Int'l Union of Electrical Workers, 410 F.2d 388, 389 (6th Cir. 1969).
123. 846 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1988).
124. Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 38 (1987). See General Drivers, Local Union 968
v. Sysco Food Services, Inc., 838 F.2d 794, 799 (5th Cir. 1988).
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For example, in HMC Management Corp. v. CarpentersDist. Council,125
the court refused to sustain an arbitral decision modifying a discharge
penalty which the arbitrator believed was inappropriate since a similarly
terminated individual had been reinstated by the company. The reviewing judges should have realized that the arbitrator had effectively concluded that the employer had failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to
support the termination of the grievant in light of the less severe treatment given the other worker. Nonetheless, since the arbiter had not expressly found a lack of "just cause," but had inadvertently indicated the
12 6
presence of cause for some discipline, the court vacated his award.
The HMC Management Corp. judges wholly ignored the Enterprise
Wheel & Car Court warning that "[a] mere ambiguity in the opinion
accompanying an award, which permits the inference that the arbitrator
may have exceeded his authority, is not a reason for refusing to enforce
the award." 12 7 The judges also overlooked the established fact that arbitrators generally do not permit disparate penalties to be imposed upon
128
similarly situated employees.
When specific contractual language does not preclude arbitral consideration of the degree of punishment imposed, courts generally defer to
arbitrator conclusions regarding this issue. The Courts understand that
parties permitting grievants to challenge disciplinary penalties necessarily recognize the authority of arbitrators to determine not only whether
the employer can establish "just cause" for some discipline, but also
whether it can demonstrate the existence of "just cause" for the particular penalty imposed. 129 On occasion, however, courts inexplicably ignore
this fundamental principle.
Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. District2130 provides a perfect example of judicial overreaching. Orders issued by the captain of the Mississippi Queen, a commercial passenger vessel, almost caused a collision
with a towboat and its barges. The captain grieved his resulting termination. Although the arbitrator found that the captain's maneuver had evidenced "gross carelessness," he concluded that the employee had been
the victim of disparate discipline based upon the fact that other pilots,
125. 750 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1985).
126. Id. at 1304.
127. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 598 (1960).
128. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 34, at 684-87.

129. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 1442, 901
F.2d 1494, 1496-98 (9th Cir. 1990); Dixie Warehouse v. Teamsters Local 89, 898 F.2d 507, 510-11

(6th Cir. 1990); Eberhard Foods, Inc. v. Handy, 868 F.2d 890, 892-93 (6th Cir. 1989); Florida Power
Corp. v. IBEW, 847 F.2d 680, 681-83 (lth Cir. 1988).
130. 889 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 897 F.2d 746 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct.
148 (1990).
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who had engaged in similar conduct, had not been discharged.13' He
thus converted the captain's termination to a suspension. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was indignant regarding the willingness of the arbitrator to second-guess the Delta Queen Company with respect to such
an important safety issue. As a result, the Fifth Circuit completely exceeded its authority and affirmed vacation of the arbitral award. Even a
cursory consideration of the arbitrator's reasoning would have indicated
that it "drew its essence" from the "just cause" language set forth in the
bargaining agreement. It is thus apparent that it was the district court
and the appellate judges, not the arbitrator, who inappropriately decided
to ignore the applicable contract provision and "to dispense [their] own
' 32
brand of industrial justice."'
Reviewing courts are frequently unfamiliar with conventional arbitral practices, and they fail to comprehend the propriety of typical arbitrator behavior. For example, judges not aware of the generally accepted
concept of "progressive discipline" might not realize that termination is
normally reserved today for cases of extreme misconduct or situations
involving incorrigible, repeat offenders.1 33 The reviewing judges might
not understand that contemporary arbitrators also tend to require more
substantial "just cause" to support suspensions and terminations, than
oral and written reprimands. 134 Since the negotiating parties have promised to resolve their contractual disputes through the arbitration process,
courts should accept the resulting arbitral determinations so long as the
determinations remotely appear to "draw their essence" from the express
or implied terms of the bargaining agreement.
Courts are likely to subject arbitral determinations to more searching judicial review in cases in which arbitrators are asked to interpret and
apply external legal doctrines. Such a situation might arise when one
party contends that a requested application of a contractual term would
contravene external law. Arbitrators reasonably assume that parties intend to adopt lawful provisions. Arbitrators do not hesitate to consider
legal principles as interpretive tools when construing ambiguous bargaining agreement provisions, in a manner designed to ensure a lawful result.13 5 In those rare instances in which it is apparent that unambiguous
bargaining agreement provisions conflict with external law, arbitrators
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 601.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 34, at 670-73.
Id. at 666-67.
Id. at 350.
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should apply the contractual terms. 1 36 In the absence of authorization
from the parties to consider such non-contractual legal doctrines, an ar1 37
bitrator would simply be without power to do otherwise.
In some instances, statutory rules have been expressly incorporated
in bargaining agreements, or submission agreements have authorized arbitrators to apply statutory laws.1 38 Where the parties have explicitly
incorporated statutory language in their bargaining agreement, and subjected questions regarding application of that clause to grievance-arbitration coverage, it must be remembered that they have provided for
arbitral determination of those issues. So long as the arbitral decision
"draws its essence" from the contractual language, it should receive judicial acceptance, even though the court might have interpreted the provision differently.1 39 A similar result should generally prevail where
parties have requested arbitral interpretation of an external statutory
provision in their submission agreement.
When construction of the contract implicitly or directly requires
an application of "external law,".., the parties have necessarily bargained for the arbitrator's interpretation of the law and are bound by
it. Since the arbitrator is the "contract reader," his interpretation of
the law becomes part of the contract and thereby part of the private
law governing the relationship between the parties to the contract.
Thus, the parties may not seek relief from the courts for an alleged
mistake of law by the arbitrator. 14
Only when the arbitral construction of "external law" is unequivocally erroneous, should a court contemplate judicial intervention. Judges
must recognize that the contracting parties jointly chose their arbitrator.
When making their selection, the parties were generally familiar with the
professional background and previous awards of that individual. They
thus had every opportunity to determine whether that person was a strict
or a liberal constructionist. A court asked to vacate an arbitral decision
136. See Kaden, supra note 30, at 289; St. Antoine, supra note 27, at 1155; Meltzer, supra note
103, at 557-58. For a contrary view, see Howlett, The Arbitrator,the NLRB, and the Courts, 20
NAT'L ACAD. ARBs. 67, 83 (1967).
137. If an arbitral award is "based solely upon the arbitrator's view of the requirements of enacted legislation, [this] would mean that he exceeded the scope of the submission." United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597 (1960). See Heinsz, supra note 118, at
258. See also Local No. P-1236, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142,
1144 (7th Cir. 1982) (arbitrator may not base award exclusively on considerations of public policy).
On the other hand, if an arbitrator ignores external law that directly conflicts with applicable contract language, a reviewing court will refuse to enforce the award because it either permits or requires the performance of a clearly unlawful act. See St. Antoine, supra note 27, at 1155.
138. See Kaden, supra note 30, at 288.
139. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
140. American Postal Workers v. United States Postal Service, 789 F.2d 1,2 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
See Jones Dairy Farm v. Local No. P-1236, United Food Workers Int'l Union, 760 F.2d 173, 176-77
(7th Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985).
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not popular with the losing party should thus "give short shrift to those
plaintiff cries of surprise and outrage from the party who now discovers
that it has lost its taste for the brand [of arbitrator] it had investigated
and then bought."1 4 1 The enforcement of such challenged awards will
not eternally prejudice the dissatisfied party. As soon as the current collective contract expires, the dissatisfied party may seek an appropriate
14 2
modification through the bargaining process.
B. JudicialIntervention Based on Public Policy Considerations
Black v. Cutter Laboratories14 3 involved an employee allegedly terminated because of her Communist Party membership. The arbitration
panel found that the real reason for the discharge concerned her protected union activity, and the panel directed her reinstatement. The California Supreme Court vacated the arbitral decision, since "an arbitration
award which directs that a member of the Communist Party who is dedicated to that party's program of 'sabotage, force, violence and the like' be
reinstated to employment in a plant which produces antibiotics ... is
against public policy." 144 The California Supreme Court thus decided
to ignore the findings of the arbitration panel and "to dispense [its] own
145
brand of industrial justice."'
If the public policy rationale espoused in Cutter Laboratorieshad
been expanded to other areas, the sanctity of labor arbitration decisions
would have been substantially undermined. Following the Cutter Laboratories decision, however, most courts were reluctant to vacate arbitral
awards unless they sanctioned clearly unlawful conduct. For example, in
Local 453, IUE v. Otis Elevator Co., 1 46 the court refused to overturn an
arbitration decision that directed the reinstatement of an employee who
had been discharged following his conviction for gambling on company
premises. The court found that the state policy against gambling had
been sufficiently vindicated through the criminal sanction imposed upon
the grievant, and it found no reason to suspect that the reinstated worker
47
would continue to engage in unlawful conduct in the future.'
141.
Review
142.
143.

Jones, supra note 28, at 893. See Ray, Protecting the Parties' Bargain After Misco: Court
of Labor Arbitration Awards, 64 IND. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1988).
See Jones, supra note 28, at 896.
43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P.2d 905, cert. granted, 350 U.S. 816 (1955), cert. dismissed, 351 U.S.

292 (1956).

144.
145.
146.
147.

43 Cal. 2d at 798-99, 278 P.2d at 911.
See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963).
Id. at 29.
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In WR. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 14 the United States
Supreme Court emphasized the narrow scope of the public policy exception. Although it acknowledged that "a court may not enforce a collective-bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy,"1 49 it noted
that judges are not authorized to negate arbitral awards anytime such
determinations offend their personal notions of public policy. "Such a
public policy.., must be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.' "150
Following the W.R. Grace & Co. decision, several appellate courts
evidenced a surprising willingness to vacate arbitral determinations based
upon public policy considerations. For example, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals refused to enforce an arbitration award that ordered the reinstatement of a truck driver who had been caught drinking while on
duty. 151
In a nation where motorists practically live on the highways, no
citation of authority is required to establish that an arbitration award
ordering a company to reinstate an over-the-road truck driver caught
drinking liquor on duty violates public policy. 152
If the employer had itself decided to impose a suspension instead of a
discharge, would the court have found it guilty of unlawful conduct?
Could any other company offer this person a driving position in the future without contravening public policy?
A similar result was achieved by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. 153 The Court vacated an arbitral award that directed the reinstatement of a postal service employee who had been convicted of embezzling
several thousand dollars -in postal funds, even though the worker would
have been transferred to another position, which did not involve access to
stamps and money.
[W]e cannot avoid the common sense implications that requiring
the rehiring of [the grievant] would have on other postal employees
and on the public in general. Other postal employees may feel there is
less reason for them to be honest than they believed-the Union could
always fix it if they were caught. Moreover, the public trust in the
Postal Service, and in the entire federal government, could be dimin148. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
1984).

Id at 766. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948).
Id. at 766 (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Great Western Food Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 124.
United States Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d 822 (1st Cir.
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ished by the idea that graft is condoned.1 54
It is difficult to believe that a long suspension without pay would not
have been sufficient to impress upon both the grievant and other postal
service employees the consequences associated with dishonest behavior.
If another federal agency were ultimately to employ the discharged postal service employee, would its action constitute a breach of public trust?
Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc.15 5 involved an employee who had been
apprehended by police in the rear seat of a fellow worker's automobile in
the company parking lot with marijuana smoke in the air and a lighted
marijuana cigarette in the frontseat ashtray. A subsequent police search
of the employee's own car revealed marijuana gleanings. When Misco
learned of the cigarette incident, it terminated the employee for having
violated a disciplinary rule that prohibited the bringing or consuming of
intoxicants or controlled substances on plant property. The employee
grieved his discharge. Although the employee operated a dangerous slitter-rewinder machine, the arbitrator ordered his reinstatement. The arbitrator found the cigarette incident insufficient to establish that the
employee had himself brought or used marijuana on company premises. 1 56 Since Misco had not learned about the marijuana gleanings
found in the grievant's car until after it had made its termination decision, the arbitrator ruled that such evidence could not be used to support
1 57
the worker's discharge.
The district court vacated the arbitral award and the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, based upon the perceived public policy
"against the operation of dangerous machinery by persons under the influence of drugs or alcohol."'158 The Supreme Court, however, unanimously reversed. The Court initially emphasized that the doctrine set
forth in W.R. Grace & Co. merely permits courts to vacate arbitral
awards based upon "some explicit public policy" that is "well defined
and dominant" and "ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.' "159 The Supreme Court found that the Fifth Circuit formulation
was not based upon "laws and legal precedents," but upon that court's
general notions of public interest.16° The Court thus concluded that the
154. Id. at 825.
155. 484 U.S. at 29 (1987).

156. Id. at 34.
157. Id.

158. Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 768 F.2d 739, 743 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd,
484 U.S. 29 (1987).

159. Id at 43 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)).
160. Id. at 44.
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lower courts had improperly overturned the arbitrator's determination.
It should now be apparent that the public policy exception is extremely limited. "Precisely because this doctrine allows courts to by-pass
the normal heavy deference accorded to arbitration awards and potentially to 'judicialize' the arbitration process, the judiciary must be cautious about overruling an arbitration award on the ground that it
conflicts with public policy.'1 6 1 Judges must recognize that they have no
right to dispense their own brand of industrial justice when applying the

public policy exception. 162 When public policy challenges are raised, the
judiciary must first determine whether there is a "well defined and dominant" public policy that is rooted in statutory or decisional law. If such a
significant policy is found, judges must then ask whether the arbitral
award in question has created an irreconcilable conflict with that
63
policy.'
Recent appellate court decisions have generally applied the public
policy exception in an appropriately narrow manner. Courts have declined to employ that doctrine to vacate arbitral awards ordering the reinstatement of commercial pilots charged with flying while under the
influence of alcohol, 164 a letter carrier who was convicted of unlawful
delay of the mail, 165 a person accepted for work at a nuclear power plant
who was terminated after he failed a psychological test used to determine
which individuals might be security risks, 166 and a postal worker who
had fired gunshots into his supervisor's unoccupied vehicle. 167
Another case involved an automobile mechanic who was discharged
for having failed for the second time to tighten wheel lug nuts. 168 After
the arbitrator directed reinstatement of this person, the mechanic's em161. E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. Grasselli Employees Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611, 615 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986).
162. See United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239, 1241
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 484 U.S. 984 (1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 680 (1988); Northwest
Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 808 F.2d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1014
(1988).
163. See Parker, JudicialReview of LaborArbitrationAwards: Misco and Its Impact on the Public Policy Exception, 4 LAB. LAW. 683, 697 (1988).
164. See Northwest Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 808 F.2d 76, 83-84 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988). Butsee Delta Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 861 F.2d 665, 671-74
(11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989).
165. See United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239, 124142 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 484 U.S. 984 (1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 680 (1988).
166. See Daniel Constr. Co. v. Local 257, IBEW, 856 F.2d 1174, 1181-83 (8th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1989).
167. See United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 839 F.2d 146, 148-50
(3d Cir. 1988).
168. See Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge 1173, 843 F.2d 357 (9th Cir. 1988),
vacated, 886 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 495 U.S. 946 (1990).
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ployer sought judicial relief. The district court vacated the award, and a
panel of the Ninth Circuit Court affirmed based upon public policy considerations. The panel decision was thereafter withdrawn, and the en
banc court decided to sustain the arbitrator's determination. 169 The en
banc court noted that before an arbitral award may be judicially overturned, "[a] court must both delineate an overriding public policy rooted
in something more than 'general considerations of supposed public interests,' and... it must demonstrate that the policy is one that specifically
militates against the relief ordered by the arbitrator."' 170 Since the en
banc court found no "explicit, well defined and dominant public policy
...that bars reinstatement of a mechanic who commits a reckless act in
the course of his employment," the court sustained the arbitrator's remedial order. 171
One rarely finds appellate decisions vacating arbitral awards based
upon public policy considerations. One of the most notorious cases involved the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 172 A nuclear power plant
mechanic was discharged for having deliberately compromised the facility's secondary containment system. The worker had decreased mobility
due to a temporary cast on one leg. He intentionally disarmed an interlock containment door, so that he could get to lunch more easily.
Although the arbitrator found this individual's conduct improper, he
concluded that the termination penalty was excessive. The Eighth Circuit Court refused to enforce the arbitrator's reinstatement directive.
The court found a strong public policy in favor of nuclear plant safety in
the general Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations. Since the court
decided that reinstatement of a worker who had deliberately undermined
nuclear safety would contravene that dominant policy, it refused to enforce the arbitral award. 173 If the nuclear facility had decided to impose
a substantial suspension, instead of a discharge, it is doubtful that the
facility would have lost its license to operate. Since the employer possessed the right to take such action unilaterally, one finds it difficult to
understand how the court could have found that the arbitrator's reinstatement order could not be sustained. 174
169. See Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge 1173, 886 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946 (1990).
170. 886 F.2d at 1212-13 (quoting Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987)).
171. Id. at 1216. See Parker, supra note 163, at 708-09.
172. Iowa Electric Light & Power v. Local Union 204, IBEW, 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987).
173. See 834 F.2d at 1427.
174. See Parker, supra note 163, at 709. See also Newsday v. Long Island Typographical Union,
915 F.2d 840, 844-45 (2d Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S.Ct. 1314 (1991), wherein the court sustained the district court's refusal to enforce an arbitral award that directed the reinstatement of an

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:571

Courts that recognize the narrow scope of the public policy exception, but wish to overturn questionable arbitral determinations, occasionally use the disingenuous device of finding that arbitrators have exceeded
their contractual authority. For example, S.D. Warren Co. v. United
PaperworkersInt'l Union 175 involved the propriety of an arbitration decision directing the reinstatement of an employee who had violated a company rule precluding possession of marijuana on plant premises. The
First Circuit Court of Appeals initially denied enforcement of the arbitral
award on public policy grounds.1 76 The Supreme Court vacated that
opinion and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the intervening Misco decision. 1 77 The First Circuit Court thereafter interpreted
the management rights clause in a questionable manner to preclude enforcement of the arbitrator's directive.1 78 So long as the arbitral award
had drawn its essence from the express or implied terms of the bargaining agreement, and did not contravene a clearly established and dominant public policy, the arbitral award should have been enforced, even
though the court did not particularly like the outcome.
The public policy exception should be applied with circumspection.
Courts that have applied this doctrine in an inappropriate fashion have
significantly undermined the arbitration process.
[T]hese courts have engaged in unprincipled and unwarranted judicial activism, because the awards in question did not violate any statute, regulation or other manifestation of positive law, or compel
conduct by an employer, union or employee that would violate such a
law. Under the guise of public policy .... these courts have substituted
179
their own views of industrial justice for the views of the arbitrator.
Courts should recognize that grievance-arbitration procedures constitute a crucial part of the collective bargaining process. They should
thus restrict application of the public policy exception to those extremely
rare instances in which the action ordered by the arbitrator would be
wholly improper if directed by the negotiating parties themselves.
[T]he critical inquiry is not whether the underlying act for which
the employee was disciplined violates public policy, but whether there
is a public policy barring reinstatementof an individual who has comindividual found to have engaged in sexual harassment of female co-workers due to the well-defined
and dominant public policy against such conduct.
175. 845 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 992 (1988).
176. See S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 815 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1987),
vacated, 484 U.S. 983 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 992 (1988).
177. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. S.D. Warren Co., 484 U.S. 983 (1987).

178. See United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 847 F.2d 775, 778
(11th Cir. 1988), for another example of judicial overreaching.

179. Edwards, JudicialReview of Labor ArbitrationAward& The Clash Between the Public Policy
Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3, 4 (1988).
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mitted a wrongful act .... [Ilt is only if the grievant is likely to engage
in wrongful conduct which violates public policy in the future that his
reinstatement could be said to violate public policy. '80
Reliance upon the public policy exception to avoid compliance with
distasteful arbitral awards has not been a frequent occurrence. From
1960 until 1988, only seventy-three cases taken to federal district court
involved such claims. 181 It is somewhat disturbing to note, however, that
there were almost as many public policy challenges from 1982 through
1988 as there were during the entire 1960 through 1981 period.1 8 2 The
Supreme Court's unanimous Misco decision reaffirming the narrow scope
of the public policy exception should diminish the number of such cases.
The labor-management system of industrial self-government is undermined far more by inappropriate judicial intervention than by questionable arbitral awards. The parties can always correct an erroneous
arbitration determination during their next round of collective bargaining. The deleterious consequences for employer-employee relations
caused by resort to external judicial proceedings tend to linger for many
years.

IV.

NLRB

DEFERRAL POLICIES

Section 10(a) of the NLRA empowers the NLRB "to prevent any
person from engaging in any unfair labor practice."' 183 Section 10(a) further provides that "[tihis power shall not be affected by any other means
of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by
agreement, law, or otherwise." 1 84 In 1947, when Congress was considering possible amendments to the NLRA, the Senate Labor Committee
formulated a proposal that would have made it an unfair labor practice
for parties "to violate the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement or
the terms of an agreement to submit a labor dispute to arbitration."' 85
The provision was ultimately deleted from the 1947 NLRA amendments,
since the House Conference concluded that "[o]nce parties have made a
180. Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1215, 1217 (9th Cir.
1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 2205 (1990) (emphasis in original). See Hexter, supra note 78, at 107;
Edwards, supra note 179, at 32-33; Dunau, supra note 75, at 199.
181. See Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 48, at 43-44 & Table 1.
182. Letter from Michael H. LeRoy to Charles B. Craver (March 13, 1990) (copy on file in IIT
Chicago-Kent Law Review office).

183. 29 U.S.C § 160(a) (1982).
184. Id.
185. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 8(a)(6) & 8(b)(5) (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 111, 114 (1959) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. See S. Res. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1947), reprinted in 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 426-27.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

(V/ol. 66:571

collective bargaining contract the enforcement of that contract should be
left to the usual processes of the law and not to the National Labor Relations Board."' 186 This perspective was finally embodied in section 203(d)
of the LMRA: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties
is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement."' 87
If one party merely contends that the other party has violated their
bargaining agreement, the aggrieved party must normally seek recourse
through the specified grievance-arbitration procedures. The controversy
would simply not be cognizable before the NLRB. There are occasions,
however, when one party's conduct may raise issues under both the unfair labor practice sections of the NLRA and express provisions contained in the applicable bargaining agreement. For example, an
employer may unilaterally change existing employment conditions, and
endeavor to defend a resulting section 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain
charge, 1 through reliance upon the authority given to it in a management prerogative clause. The fact that resolution of the basic NLRA
dispute would involve construction of the contractual management rights
provision would not divest the Labor Board of its unfair labor practice
jurisdiction. The Labor Board has the power to interpret relevant bargaining agreement terms to the extent necessary to enable it to resolve
the interrelated unfair labor practice question. 8 9 Such overlapping jurisdictional issues may be similarly raised when parties have included contractual protections analogous to those rights set forth in the NLRA.
When contractual disputes overlap with NLRA controversies, the
Labor Board must determine the appropriate way in which it should
treat applicable grievance-arbitration procedures. If the unfair labor
practice charge is filed before arbitration proceedings have been instituted, the Labor Board will frequently direct the disputing parties to utilize their arbitral forum before they seek NLRB assistance. When an
arbitral award has been issued prior to the invocation of Labor Board
jurisdiction, the Board will usually defer to the pertinent findings of the
private adjudicator. If grievance-arbitration procedures are properly
viewed as a continuation of the collective bargaining process, it becomes
186. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 42 (1947), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 505, 546.

187. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
188. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
fail to bargain in good faith with the designated bargaining representative of its employees.

189. See NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 428-29 (1967).
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apparent that the NLRB's pre-arbitration and post-arbitration deferral
policies are overly broad.
A.

Pre-ArbitrationDeferral

Dubo Manufacturing Corp.1 90 involved a union claim that the employer had committed a section 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain, and had impermissibly discharged certain employees because of their exercise of
protected rights. 19 1 The labor organization filed unfair labor practice
charges with the NLRB, and commenced a section 301 action in U.S.
district court requesting an order directing the company to arbitrate the
propriety of the worker terminations. While the unfair labor practice
charges were pending, the district court ordered arbitration. The Labor
Board decided to hold the unfair labor practice charges in abeyance,
pending completion of the arbitration process. The Labor Board noted
the LMRA section 203(d) policy in favor of private dispute resolution
procedures, and concluded that it would best effectuate that policy by
192
deferring the section 8(a)(3) discharge cases to arbitration.
In Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.,'19 3 the NLRB employed pre-arbitration deferral in a section 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain case involving a unilateral change that the employer claimed was authorized by the
contractual management prerogative clause. The action was taken despite the fact that the labor organization had neither sought nor wished
to obtain arbitral resolution of the underlying issues. The Board described the circumstances in which pre-arbitration deferral would be presumptively appropriate in refusal-to-bargain cases.
[Wlhere... the contract clearly provides for grievance and arbitration machinery, where the unilateral action taken is not designed to
undermine the Union and is not patently erroneous but rather is based
on a substantial claim of contractual privilege, and it appears that the
arbitral interpretation of the contract will resolve both the unfair labor
practice issue and the contract interpretation issue in a manner compatible with the purposes of the [NLRA], then the194
Board should defer
to the arbitration clause conceived by the parties.
Two years later, in Collyer Insulated Wire,' 95 the Labor Board reaf190. 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963).
191. Under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discriminate against employees because of their exercise of rights protected in section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
192. See 142 N.L.R.B. at 432-33.
193. 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969).
194. Id. at 142.
195. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
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firmed the standards enunciated in Joseph Schlitz Brewing, 196 as it deferred another unilateral change case to arbitration. The Board
emphasized that it would only order such deferral when the respondent
has evidenced no enmity with respect to the exercise of protected rights
197
and has indicated a willingness to participate in the arbitral process.
The Board also reserved jurisdiction "solely for the purpose of entertaining an appropriate and timely motion for further consideration upon a
proper showing that either (a) the dispute has not, with reasonable
promptness after the issuance of this decision, either been resolved by
amicable settlement in the grievance procedure or submitted promptly to
arbitration, or (b) the grievance arbitration procedures have not been fair
19 8
and regular or have reached a result which is repugnant to the Act."
In National Radio Co.,199 the Labor Board decided to expand the
Collyer pre-arbitration deferral doctrine to include cases involving claims
of individual discrimination under section 8(a)(3). The Board majority
expressly rejected the suggestion that deferral of individual rights cases
constituted an inappropriate denial of NLRB unfair labor practice jurisdiction to persons who deliberately chose Board procedures over the arbitral process.
[A]bstention simply cannot be equated with abdication. We are,
instead, adjuring the parties to seek resolution of their dispute under
the provisions of their own contract and thus fostering both the collective relationship and the Federal policy favoring voluntary arbitration
and dispute settlement. And by reserving jurisdiction we preserve the
right of the Charging Party to seek from us vindication of statutory
rights should
the arbitration reach a result not tolerable under the
statute.200
Dissenting Members Fanning and Jenkins strenuously protested
Collyer deferral in cases involving alleged discrimination against individual employees, who opposed resolution of their claims through arbitral
procedures.
Statutory protection against discrimination on the job because of
engaging in, or refraining from, union activity is an individual right,
unlike the union or group right to be protected from unilateral changes
196. Id. at 841-42.
197. Id. at 842.
198. Id. at 843. The post-arbitration review standard set forth in part (b) was taken from
SpielbergManufacturingCo., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955). See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
199. 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
200. Id. at 531. In Kansas Meat Packers, 198 N.L.R.B. 543 (1972), the Board indicated that it
would decline to order Collyer deferral in those infrequent cases in which it is apparent that the
interests of individual discriminates are in conflict with the interests of the representative labor organization or its officials.
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in the collective-bargaining agreement. Because it is granted by the
statute to individuals, it cannot be reduced, altered, or displaced by
any agreement between the employer and the union .... A union and
employer may lawfully agree to arbitrate any differences they have
over provisions in their agreement. But they cannot lawfully agree that
they will arbitrate between themselves discrimination by one of them
against an employee, unless that employee joins in or plainly acquiesces
in and adopts that method of determining his rights.. 201
In General American Transportation Corp.,20 2 the concerns expressed by dissenting Members Fanning and Jenkins about the need for
Labor Board protection of individual rights induced the NLRB to reconsider the expansive deferral doctrine that had been articulated in National Radio. The two-member plurality noted that section 10(a)
provides that the Board's power to rectify unfair labor practices "shall
not be affected by any other means of adjustment . . . established by
agreement, law, or otherwise," and they concluded that the NLRB is
20 3
statutorily obliged to resolve all unfair labor practice allegations.
They further emphasized that "[t]he protection ... afforded employees
by the Act is clearly an individual, as contrasted with a union or group,
right." 2o4
In her concurring opinion, Chairman Murphy rejected the notion
that all NLRB pre-arbitration deferral constituted an inappropriate abdication of unfair labor practice authority.
In cases alleging violations of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3), based
on conduct assertedly in derogation of the contract, the principal issue
is whether the complained-of conduct is permitted by the parties' contract. Such issues are eminently suited to the arbitral process, and resolution of the contract issue by an arbitrator will, as a rule, dispose of
the unfair labor practice issue. On the other hand, in cases alleging
violations of sections 8(a)(1), (a)(3), b(l)(A), and b(2), although arguably also involving a contract violation, the determinative issue is not
whether the conduct is permitted by the contract, but whether the conduct was unlawfully motivated or whether it otherwise interfered with,
restrained, or coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. In these situations, an arbitrator's
issue will not dispose of the unfair labor
resolution of the contract
205
practice allegation.
201. 198 N.L.R.B. at 533 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
202. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
203. Id. at 808.
204. Id.
205. Id at 810-11. Section 8(aXl), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982), prohibits employer interference
with protected employee rights. Section 8(aX3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(aX3) (1982), proscribes employer
discrimination against employees because of their exercise of protected rights. Section 8(bX1XA), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982), prohibits labor organization interference with protected employee
rights, while section 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1982), makes it an unfair labor practice for a
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Chairman Murphy thus concluded that while pre-arbitration deferral
would continue to be appropriate with respect to cases involving section
8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) refusal-to-bargain allegations, such deferral would not
be proper with regard to alleged violations of individual rights. Dissenting Members Penello and Walther would have continued to follow the
2 °6
broad National Radio deferral policy.
In United Technologies Corp.,20 7 a new Labor Board majority reexamined the diverse rationales that had been articulated in NationalRadio
and GeneralAmerican Transportation,and they concluded that pre-arbitration deferral would be appropriate with respect to both refusal-to-bargain and individual rights cases.
[D]eferral is not akin to abdication. It is merely the prudent exercise of restraint, a postponement of the use of the Board's processes to
give the parties' own dispute resolution machinery a chance to succeed. The Board's processes may always be invoked if the arbitral result is inconsistent with the standard of Spielberg.208
The Board thus overruled GeneralAmerican Transportationand reestablished the National Radio doctrine. Dissenting Member Zimmerman
would have continued to follow the deferral policy set forth in General
2°9
American Transportation.
In United Beef Co., 210 the Labor Board indicated that it would permit the pre-arbitration deferral doctrine to preclude NLRB consideration
of section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) charges, even though the representative labor organization was unwilling to proceed to arbitration. Shop Steward
Roberto Rodriguez claimed that the employer had harassed and ultimately discharged him because of his processing of employee grievances.
He had filed a grievance protesting his adverse treatment, and the union
had requested arbitration. A hearing had been scheduled before the industry arbitrator. After it had received several unfavorable rulings from
the arbitrator on other matters, the labor organization decided to withdraw Mr. Rodriguez's case from arbitration. When Mr. Rodriguez endeavored to obtain redress before the Labor Board, it decided to defer to
the incomplete grievance-arbitration procedures. "To permit [the
union's] withdrawal [from arbitration] in circumstances where the Respondent is willing to proceed and absent any showing that the arbitral
labor organization to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against employees in
violation of section 8(a)(3).
206. 228 N.L.R.B. at 814-18.
207. 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
208. Id. at 560. Regarding the post-arbitration deferral standards enunciated in SpielbergManufacturing Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), see infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
209. 268 N.L.R.B. at 561-64.
210. 272 N.L.R.B. 66 (1984).
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process or result would be repugnant to the Act is clearly contrary to the
2 11
principles of United Technologies."
The judicial response to the Labor Board's pre-arbitration deferral
policies has not been entirely favorable. The Supreme Court has approvingly quoted from Collyer Insulated Wire, 2 12 and other courts have ex2 13
pressly accepted the deferral approach set forth in that decision.
Appellate courts have also sustained the more expansive pre-arbitration
deferral policy articulated in United Technologies Corp.214 Nonetheless,
in Hammontree v. NLRB, 2 15 a 2-1 panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected pre-arbitration deferral with respect to most unfair labor practice claims concerning individual rights.
Deferral to arbitration is perfectly legitimate when the issues submitted to the arbitrator require contractual interpretation. However,
when an unfair labor practice against an employee is involved, the
Board, by deferring to arbitration, is asking a potentially hostile or
indifferent agent to enforce the employee's statutorily mandated rights.
Although the Board argues that it retains jurisdiction in such cases to
ensure that the result reached is not repugnant to the NLRB, the great
amount of deference that the Board pays to the arbitration committee's
decision makes it extremely difficult for an employee to have an arbitration decision overturned .... We hold that the NLRB's current
policy of deferring non-contractual ULP claims to
2 16arbitration represents an abdication of the Board's statutory duty.
The Hammontree panel majority aptly noted that the original version of the NLRA introduced by Senator Wagner in 1935 contained a
section that would have provided that the Labor Board "may, in its discretion, defer its exercise of jurisdiction over any... unfair labor practice
in any case where there is another means of prevention provided for by
agreement ... which has not been utilized. '2 17 The fact Congress decided not to include this provision led the panel majority to conclude that
the Labor Board should normally determine unfair labor practice questions despite the availability of contractual arbitration procedures.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recently decided to vacate the prior Hammontree panel decision and to consider the case on an
211. Id. at 68.
212. See William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12, 16, 17 (1974).
213. See, e.g., Local 700, IAM v. NLRB, 525 F.2d 237, 244-45 (2d Cir. 1975); Local Union
2188, IBEW v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1087, 1090 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974).
214. See, e.g., Lewis v. NLRB, 800 F.2d 818, 820-21 (8th Cir. 1986).
215. 894 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
216. Id. at 447.
217. Id. at 444. See S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(b) (1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 1935, 1301 (1949).
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en banc basis. 218 The en banc majority rejected the reasoning that had
been adopted by the panel majority. It instead sustained the authority of
the Labor Board to employ pre-arbitration deferral even with respect to
unfair labor practice charges involving alleged interference with the statutorily protected rights of individual employees. The en banc majority
found no persuasive evidence in the language of the NLRA or its legislative history to indicate that the NLRB may not employ pre-arbitration
deferral in appropriate unfair labor practice cases concerning either collective bargaining rights or the protections afforded to individual
2 19
employees.
If grievance-arbitration procedures are viewed as a continuation of
the collective bargaining process, it becomes apparent that pre-arbitration deferral is appropriate in refusal-to-bargain cases, but not in cases
concerning individual employee rights. Section 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) cases
concern claims that employers or representative labor organizations have
not negotiated in good faith. The rights protected by these unfair labor
practice provisions involve collective and organizational interests. The
rights pertain to the viability of labor unions as group representatives. It
should be clear that labor organizations will generally pursue their collective rights diligently, since violations in this area tend to undermine
the ability of unions to perform their basic representational function. Labor Board deferral with respect to these cases would not diminish the
bargaining process-it would actually enhance the process. 2 20 The recalcitrant parties would be forced to acknowledge the representational legitimacy of their respective counterparts by participating in joint arbitration
hearings.
Unfair labor practice proceedings are more formal than grievancearbitration hearings, and they involve the enforcement of external, legal
rights. Arbitral proceedings, on the other hand, are less formal, and they
concern the enforcement of mutually accepted contractual rights. It
should thus be obvious that Labor Board deferral to grievance-arbitration procedures is appropriate to resolve refusal-to-bargain allegations
that pertain to the interpretation and enforcement of express or implied
bargaining agreement provisions. Such Board deferral mandates continued respect for the very collective bargaining process that has been adversely affected by one party's alleged refusal to negotiate. It is also
entirely consistent with the substantial federal labor policy favoring reso218. Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc).
219. Id. at 1496-99.
220. See Zimmerman, The Teamster Joint Grievance Committee and NLRB Deferral Policy: A
Failure to Protect the Individual Employee's Statutory Rights, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1453, 1457 (1985).
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lution of "grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement" through the
2 21
procedures agreed upon by the contracting parties themselves
Individual rights protected by sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A),
and 8(b)(2) differ significantly from the collective and organizational
rights covered in sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3). The rights do not emanate
from the bargaining relationship nor from the collective contract, but
from the NLRA itself. In section 10(a), Congress empowered the Labor
Board to rectify unfair labor practice violations, and it expressly stated
that "[t]his power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment
or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or
otherwise ....-222 Given this unmistakable legislative mandate, the
NLRB should be extremely hesitant to transfer its adjudicatory function
to private decision-makers. While deferral in refusal-to-bargain cases
compels the disputing parties to endeavor to resolve their statutory controversy through a continuation of the collective bargaining process,
deferral in individual rights cases serves no such function.
Individual statutory rights may be jeopardized during arbitral proceedings because of diverse employee and labor organization interests. 2 23
2 24
Union representatives may not particularly like the grievant involved.
It is also possible that the labor organization believes that the collective
good may be enhanced through the sacrifice of individual rights. It is
important to recognize that labor arbitrators are selected by employers
and unions, without meaningful input from grievants, and that those entities control the hearing procedures. 225 It is thus easy to comprehend
why the rights of individual employees may not be optimally protected
before conventional arbitration tribunals. With respect to NLRB proceedings, however, such claimants receive free representation from experienced NLRB attorneys, and their cases are heard by wholly
independent administrative law judges.
When individual rights are concerned, the Labor Board should per221. Section 203(d) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
222. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982). See Peck, A Proposal to End NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration
Process, 60 WAsH. L. REv. 355, 378 (1985); Newman, NLRB Deferral to Arbitration in Unfair Labor
Practice Cases (Labor's View), in 26 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 49, 68 (1974).
223. See Bush, The Nature ofthe Deferral Problem Involving Section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) Charges,
4 LAB. LAW. 103, 112 (1988).
224. When it is clear that union animosity toward a particular grievant would likely deprive that
individual of a fair arbitral hearing, deferral will not be ordered. See Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 272
N.L.R.B. 438 (1984) (misdated in NLRB Reports], affirmed by order, 762 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1985).
225. See Getman, Collyer Insulated Wire: A Case of Misplaced Modesty, 49 IND. L.J. 57, 68-69
(1973); Isaacson & Zifchak, Agency Deferral to Private Arbitration of Employment Disputes 73
COLUM. L. REV. 1383, 1400 (1973).
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mit the directly affected employees to choose between resort to griev2 26
ance-arbitration procedures and adjudication before the NLRB.
"When the grieving party forgoes or rejects arbitration, a strong presumption arises that the collective bargaining relationship is suffering severe distress. ' 22 7 The individual grievant may fear that the
representative labor organization may not process the case diligently.
The claimant may alternatively be concerned about the financial capacity
of the union to retain the services of a competent legal advocate. "Prearbitral deferral might constitute an effective denial of any remedy if...
arbitration of the dispute would impose an undue financial burden upon
one of the parties. ' 228 The statutory rights of individual employees
should not be so dependent upon the willingness and financial capacity of
representative labor organizations to present their cases before relatively
2 29
expensive arbitral tribunals.
The fact that individual rights protected by section 7 of the NLRA
differ significantly from collective bargaining rights, secured by section
8(a)(5), also militates in favor of a bifurcated approach to pre-arbitration
deferral. Although the submission of duty-to-bargain disputes to arbitral
procedures that are part of the bargaining process itself actually furthers
the collective rights, NLRB deferral of individual rights cases does not
generate the same beneficial result. Labor unions may lawfully waive
230
their right to bargain through management prerogative provisions,
and they may even relinquish the collective right of bargaining unit personnel to engage in concerted activity. 23 1 The labor organizations may
not, however, agree to waive basic rights provided to individual employ226. See Alleyne, Arbitrators and the NLRB: The Nature of the DeferralBeast, 4 INDUs. REL.
L.J. 587, 601 (1981).

227. Zimmer, Wired For Collyer: RationalizingNLRB and Arbitration Jurisdiction,48 IND. L.J.
141, 166 (1973). When a section 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain charge is involved, it is not inappropriate
to direct pre-arbitration deferral-unless the labor organization can demonstrate that the employer's
challenged action was "designed to undermine the union [or] ... is [not] based on a substantial claim
of contractual privilege." Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141, 142 (1969). See supra note

194 and accompanying text. So long as there is no evidence to indicate that the employer is endeavoring to denigrate the union's representational authority, it is proper to require the parties to utilize
the collective bargaining process to resolve their dispute-.Le., complete the internal grievance-arbi-

tration procedures-before they seek assistance from external Labor Board proceedings.
228. Local Union 2188, IBEW v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
835 (1974). See Morris, NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Prcew" The Arbitrator's Awesome Responsibility, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 290, 308 (1985).

229. See Covington, Arbitrators and the Board: A Revised Relationship, 57 N.C.L. REV. 91, 116
(1978).
230. See F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 304
(1986); R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 469-71 (1976).

231. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974); F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra
note 225, at 203-04.
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ees in section 7 of the NLRA. 232 In the dissenting opinion in National
Radio Co., Members Fanning and Jenkins succinctly acknowledged this
critical distinction between individual and collective rights.
Statutory protection against discrimination on the job because of
engaging in, or refraining from, union activity is an individual right,
unlike the union or group right to be protected from unilateral changes
in the collective-bargaining agreement. Because it is granted by the
statute to individuals, it cannot be reduced, altered, 233
or displaced by
any agreement between the employer and the union.
If pre-arbitration deferral is employed with respect to unfair labor
practice charges alleging violations of wholly individual rights, labor unions will effectively be able to control the enforcement of those statutory
protections. The labor organizations might directly waive such rights
through grievance settlements that do not fully protect individual employee interests. 234 They might indirectly accomplish the same result
through arbitral presentations that do not forcefully advance the claims
of individual grievants. The Labor Board should not be able to employ a
pre-arbitration deferral policy that permits representative labor organizations to directly or indirectly "waive" individual employee rights that
could not be lawfully waived through the traditional collective bargain235
ing process.
The resolution of individual rights claims through NLRB procedures would optimally protect those rights and would be consistent with
the Labor Board's section 10(a) obligation to rectify unfair labor practice
violations. 236 Such important statutory interests would be determined by
the expert administrative agency established by Congress to accomplish
237
that result, and it would guarantee a uniform national labor policy.
When arbitration decisions incorrectly permit unilateral employer action
with respect to mandatory subjects of bargaining, the adversely affected
labor organizations can easily rectify the problem during the next round
of bargaining discussions. When, however, arbitral awards erroneously
sacrifice individual rights protected by the NLRA, it is less likely that
losing unions will endeavor to reverse those decisions through the bar232. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. at 325-26 (1974).
233. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. at 533 (1972) (emphasis in original).
234. See, e.g., Mahon v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 1342, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1987); Roadway Express, Inc.
v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 415, 419-25 (4th Cir. 1981); Alpha Beta Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1546, 1547 (1985).
235. See Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA: Part II-A Fresh Approach
to Board Deferral to Arbitration, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 680, 686, 691-94 (1981); Note, Limiting Deferral
Under the Spielberg Doctrine, 67 VA. L. REv. 615, 624-27 (1981).
236. See Isaacson & Zifchak, supra note 225, at 1387.
237. See Edwards, Labor Arbitration at the Crossroad&" The "Common Law of the Shop" v. External Law, 32 ARB. J. 65, 79 (1977).
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gaining process, except in those infrequent instances in which numerous
bargaining unit members feel aggrieved.
B. Post-ArbitrationDeferral
Unfair labor practice charges occasionally concern factual or legal
questions that have been the subject of a previous grievance-arbitration
proceeding. The party which prevailed in the prior contractual forum
may ask the NLRB to accept the arbitrator's findings. In Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 238 the Labor Board recognized the federal labor policy
favoring grievance arbitration would be enhanced through NLRB deferral to such arbitral determinations in appropriate unfair labor practice
cases. The Board therefore announced that it would accept post-arbitration deferral whenever certain standards are satisfied.
[T]he [arbitration] proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration 23
panel
is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the
9
Act.

In Raley's Supermarkets, the Board held that such post-arbitration deferral would also be employed in representation cases. 24° In subsequent
cases, the NLRB indicated that it would similarly defer to settlement
agreements negotiated by the disputing parties during previous grievance
24
discussions. '
In Monsanto Chemical Co.,242 the Labor Board refused to defer to a
prior arbitral award, since the arbitrator had expressly declined to consider the unfair labor practice issue. Arbitral deferral was rejected in
Raytheon Co., 24 3 because it was apparent that the arbitrator had failed to
determine a factual question that was critical to the subsequent unfair
labor practice proceeding. In Yourga Trucking Inc.,2 " the NLRB emphasized that deferral would be inappropriate, unless the party request238. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
239. Id at 1082. When the record indicated that the prior arbitral hearing was not "fair and
regular" (see Gateway Transportation Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1763 (1962)), or that the arbitral result was
inconsistent with NLRA policy (see NLRB v. Max Factor & Co., 640 F.2d 197, 203-04 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981)), the Board declined to defer under the Spielberg Manufacturing standards.
240. 143 N.L.R.B. 256, 258-59 (1963).
241. See, e.g., Central Cartage Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 337 (1973); Alpha Beta Co., 273 N.L.R.B.
1546, 1547 (1985). Such Labor Board deferral to prior settlement agreements has received judicial
approval. See, e.g., Mahon v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 1342, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1987); Roadway Express,
Inc. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 415, 418-24 (4th Cir. 1981).
242. 130 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1099 (1961).
243. 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 885 (1963), enforcement denied on other grounds, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir.
1964).
244. 197 N.L.R.B. 928 (1972). See also Airco Industrial Gases, 195 N.L.R.B. 676, 677 (1972).
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ing deferral could demonstrate that the arbitrator had been presented
with, and had considered, the relevant unfair labor practice issues.
In Electronic Reproduction Service Corp.,245 the NLRB substantially
relaxed its post-arbitration deferral standard. The Labor Board feared
that the Yourga Trucking approach would encourage parties to withhold
relevant evidence during arbitration proceedings, to preserve the availability of NLRB consideration of related unfair labor practice issues in
case they failed to prevail before the arbitrator. 246 The Board thus decided that it would henceforth defer to arbitral awards when the parties
had the opportunity to present the pertinent evidence. Even if the parties
failed to do so, unless the party opposing deferral could show that "unu247
sual circumstances" prevented the submission of such evidence.
The Ninth Circuit Court rejected the Electronic Reproduction Service approach. 248 The court noted that "the presence of arbitration machinery does not oust the Board of jurisdiction to adjudicate unfair labor
practices," and the court held that "when it is impossible to determine
what issues the arbitration panel considered... the Board should... not
defer. '249 In Suburban Motor Freight,Inc.,2 5° the NLRB overruled Electronic Reproduction Service and reinstated the prior Yourga Trucking
standard requiring "the party seeking Board deferral ... to prove that
'25 1
the [unfair labor practice] issue... was litigated before the arbitrator.
In Olin Corp.,2 52 the Labor Board significantly liberalized its postarbitration deferral standards.
We would find that an arbitrator has adequately considered the
unfair labor practice if (1) the contractual issue is factually parallel to
the unfair labor practice issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented
generally with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice.
In this respect, differences, if any, between the contractual and statutory standards of review should be weighed by the Board as part of its
determination under the Spielberg standards of whether an award is
"clearly repugnant" to the Act. And, with regard to the inquiry into
the "clearly repugnant" standard, we would not require an arbitrator's
award to be totally consistent with Board precedent. Unless the award
is "palpably wrong," Le., unless the arbitrator's decision is not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act, we will defer.
245. 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
246. Id at 761.
247. Id at 762.
248. Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977).
249. 550 F.2d at 537. See Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
250. 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980).
251. Id. at 147. See Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 136, 137-38
(1982). affirmed by order, 742 F.2d 1438 (2d Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Magnetics Int'l, Inc., 699 F.2d
806, 810-11 (6th Cir. 1983).
252. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
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Finally, we would require that the party seeking to have the
Board reject deferral and consider the merits of a given case show that
the above standards for deferral have not been met. Thus, the party
seeking to have the Board ignore the determination of an arbitrator has
the burden of affirmatively
demonstrating the defects in the arbitral
25 3
process or award.

Only where the party opposing deferral can demonstrate that the arbitrator was not presented with the factual circumstances pertinent to the
unfair labor practice issues, 254 or that the arbitral award is "palpably
256
wrong, '2 5 will the Labor Board now reject post-arbitration deferral.
The judicial response to the new Olin Corp. standards has not been
entirely favorable. A few decisions have simply deferred to the Labor
Board's expertise and sustained the new criteria. 25 7 Other decisions have
accepted the Olin Corp. standards, but concluded that the NLRB improperly applied its own deferral test. For example, in Garcia v.
NLRB, 258 the court found that the Labor Board had inappropriately deferred to a prior arbitral award which had converted a discharge to a tenday suspension for a delivery driver, who had refused to obey a supervisory order to tap his horn when stopping to make residential deliveries,
where state law prohibited horn honking except when required for safety
reasons. Since the court found that the imposition of discipline on an
employee who declines to violate state law contravenes section 8(a)(1),
the court concluded that the arbitral determination was repugnant to the
259
policies of the NLRA.
253. Id. at 574.
254. See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 277 N.L.R.B. 1388 n.2 (1985); Hendrickson Bros.,
Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 438, 440 (1984) [misdated in NLRB Reports], affirmed by order, 762 F.2d 990
(2d Cir. 1985).
255. The mere fact that the Labor Board might have resolved the statutory question differently
does not preclude deferral, so long as the arbitral determination is not completely erroneous. See
United Parcel Service, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 667, 669 (1985). See also NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 374 (3d Cir. 1980):
[I]t is an abuse of discretion for the Board to refuse to defer to an arbitration award
where the findings of the arbitrator may arguably be characterized as not inconsistent with
Board policy. In other words, "[i]f the reasoning behind an award is susceptible of two
interpretations, one permissible and one impermissible, it is simply not true that the award
was 'clearly repugnant' to the Act." Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352, 354
(9th Cir. 1979).
256. A similar standard is applied to determine whether the NLRB should defer to previous
grievance settlements. The Board will defer to such settlement arrangements, even though they fail
to provide grievants with the make-whole relief to which they would be entitled if they prevailed in
an unfair labor practice proceeding. See Alpha Beta Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1546, 1547 (1985); Mahon v.
NLRB, 808 F.2d 1342, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1987).
257. See, eg., Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Workers v. NLRB, 730 F.2d 812, 815-16 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
258. 785 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1986).
259. Id at 809-10.
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Darr v. NLRB 260 involved a shop steward who had been discharged
because of activities she and other employees had engaged in to protest
the termination of three other stewards. The arbitrator found that there
was not "just cause" for the discharge, and he indicated that the "primary motive" of the employer had concerned her protected union activities.261 Although he noted that the NLRB would probably award full
backpay in such a case, the arbitrator decided to deny such relief, since
the grievant had failed to follow supervisory directives during her protest. The administrative law judge found the arbitrator's failure to award
backpay repugnant to the policies of the NLRA, and he ordered such
relief.262 The NLRB, however, deferred to the arbitral determination.
The court of appeals decided to remand the case to the Labor Board for
an explanation why it accepted an arbitral award that had failed to provide compensatory relief commensurate with what the NLRB would normally have provided in the same circumstances. "We have profound
doubts that the Board may defer to an arbitrator's award merely because
the award is roughly analogous to that which the Board would grant...
without explicitly articulating its view of the interrelationship between
the law of a particular collective bargaining agreement and the
263
NLRA.'
In Taylor v. NLRB, 264 the Eleventh Circuit Court reviewed the
traditional post-arbitration deferral standards, and concluded that the
iew Olin Corp. criteria were simply inconsistent with the legislative intent underlying the NLRA. The court emphasized the fact that section
10(a) obliges the Labor Board to prevent unfair labor practices and expressly provides that this Board responsibility "shall not be affected by
any other means of adjustment or prevention. '2 65 The court then concluded that the revised deferral standards conflicted with the Board's
statutorily prescribed mandate.
[I]t is apparent that the Olin Corp. standard ... does not protect
sufficiently an employee's rights granted by the National Labor Rela260.
261.
262.
263.

801 F.2d 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1406.
Id.
Id at 1409. On remand, the Labor Board finally decided that deferral to the previous

arbitral award was not warranted, since it could "find nothing in the arbitrator's opinion that pro-

vides a rational basis for the [employer's] discharging Darr, apart from her union activities, or that
recounts misconduct that would justify withholding her back pay." Cone Mills Corp., 298 N.L.R.B.
No. 70, 134 L.R.R.M. 1105, 1110 (1990). Had the Board accepted the original rationale of the
administrative law judge, it would have done more to preserve individual NLRA rights and less to
invade the traditional province of the labor arbitrator. See United Cable TV, 299 N.L.R.B. No. 20,
135 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1990).
264. 786 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 237 (1989).
265. Id. at 1518.
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tions Act. By presuming, until proven otherwise, that all arbitration
proceedings confront and decide every possible unfair labor practice
issue, Olin Corp. gives away too much of the Board's responsibility
under the NLRA ....
Olin Corp. either overlooks or ignores those
instances where contract and statutory issues may be factually parallel
but involve
distinct elements of proof and questions of factual
266
relevance.
The Taylor court thus decided that the Labor Board should continue to
267
follow the traditional Spielberg Manufacturing deferral standards.
The Labor Board's post-arbitration deferral policy is both too easily
satisfied and overly expansive. The revised Olin Corp. standards no
longer require a showing that the arbitrator actually considered the unfair labor practice issue. The NLRB presumes adequate arbitral consideration whenever (1) the contractual question is "factually parallel" to
the unfair labor practice claim, and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to a resolution of the unfair labor practice
issue. 263 Such a loose standard inappropriately permits Board deferral
even when there is no clear showing that the facts pertinent to the unfair
labor practice case have been presented to and adequately considered by
269
the contractual adjudicator.
The revised Olin Corp. criteria ignore the critical distinction between arbitration and Labor Board proceedings. Labor arbitrators are
merely empowered to interpret and apply pertinent contractual provisions. The labor arbitrators derive their authority exclusively from the
bargaining agreement and are not usually authorized to apply external
legal doctrines. Even when contractual issues and unfair labor practice
issues overlap, arbitrators are obliged to focus primarily upon the bargaining agreement terms. There will thus be many instances in which
arbitral awards involving disputes that are "factually parallel" to unfair
labor practice charges, arising from the same operative circumstances,
will not be determinative of the external NLRA issues.
Post-arbitration deferral should not be viewed as a right, but rather
a privilege. Under section 10(a), it is legislatively presumed that unfair
labor practice questions will be resolved by the Labor Board. In any case
266. Id. at 1521-22.
267. Id at 1522.
268. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. See also Comment, NLRB Deferral to Arbitration: Placing Individual Employees' Statutory Rights Upon the Sacrificial Altar of Olin to Promote a
National Labor Policy Favoring Private Dispute Resolution, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 323, 331
(1988); Greenfield, The NLRB's Deferralto ArbitrationBefore and After Olin: An EmpiricalAnalysis,
42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 34, 46-47 (1988).
269. See Henkel & Kelly, Deferral to Arbitration After Olin and United Technologie" Has the
NLRB Gone Too Far?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 37, 54-55 (1986); Gates & Elder, Olin Must Not
and Will Not Survive, 38 LAB. L.J. 723, 731 (1987).
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in which it is clear that a previous arbitral determination thoroughly and
appropriately disposed of a pending unfair labor practice charge, the
NLRB should consider deferral. The party requesting such deferral
should be obliged to demonstrate that: (1) the arbitral proceedings were
fair and regular and the parties had agreed to be bound by the result; (2)
the facts relevant to the unfair labor practice case were presented to and
fully considered by the arbitrator; (3) the arbitral decision has effectively
resolved the dispute underlying the pending unfair labor practice charge;
and (4) the arbitral conclusions are not repugnant to the policies embodied in the NLRA. While the Board should not hesitate to accept arbitral
fact findings that satisfy these prerequisites, the Board should be careful
to review statutory interpretations to preserve a uniform national labor
policy.
The existing Board deferral doctrine also fails to acknowledge the
important difference between refusal-to-bargain and individual rights
cases. The congruency between contractual disputes and unfair labor
practice disputes is greatest with respect to refusal-to-bargain cases involving unilateral employer action. 270 The employer generally admits
that it has modified employment conditions, but maintains that a management prerogative clause authorized such conduct. In such cases, resolution of the contractual claim will normally dispose of the section
8(a)(5) controversy. If the arbitrator concludes that the employer was
contractually empowered to act unilaterally, there is no 8(a)(5) violation.
Conversely, if no such authorization is found, the arbitrator will order
restoration of the status quo ante and direct the employer to refrain from
such unilateral action in the future. So long as the arbitral determination
"draws its essence" from the express or implied terms of the collective
bargaining agreement, and the arbitral proceedings have been fair and
regular, the Labor Board should defer to that decision.
Such refusal-to-bargain disputes are more directly concerned with
the interpretation and application of bargaining agreement terms than
with external NLRA provisions. It is thus more appropriate to have the
parties' "designated contract reader" 27' construe their contractual language, than to have the Labor Board interpret those provisions. This
practice is consistent with the LMRA section 203(d) policy favoring the
resolution of "disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective-bargaining agreement" through the procedures estab270. See supra note 235, 67 VA. L. REV. at 625-27.
271. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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The approach is also compatible

with the notion that grievance-arbitration procedures constitute the final
stage of the collective bargaining process, and the belief that refusal-tobargain claims are optimally resolved by the parties through the ultimate
stage of the negotiation process.
Arbitral deferral is generally inappropriate with respect to unfair
labor practice charges concerning the rights of individual employees. In
individual rights cases, grievants not only seek redress for their own injuries but also endeavor to vindicate the important congressional policies
embodied in section 7 of the NLRA. This crucial fact has been recognized by the Supreme Court in cases asking courts to give preclusive
effect in statutory rights cases to prior arbitral determinations involving
related contractual disputes. In Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 27 3 the
Supreme Court unanimously ruled that plaintiffs alleging employment
discrimination contravening Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964274
should not be prevented from having their Title VII claims heard in district court merely because they had lost previous arbitral cases in which
they had raised the discrimination question.
The Gardner-Denver Court initially compared the Title VII remedial procedures with those applicable to unfair labor practice cases.
The [Title VII] scheme is somewhat analogous to the procedure
under the National Labor Relations Act... where disputed transactions may implicate both contractual and statutory rights. Where the
statutory right underlying a particular claim may not be abridged by
contractual agreement, the Court has recognized that consideration of
the claim by the arbitrator as a contractual dispute under the collective-bargaining agreement does not preclude subsequent consideration
of the claim by the National Labor Relations Board as an unfair labor
practice charge.. 275
The Court further emphasized the limited role performed by grievance
arbitrators.
[T]he arbitrator's task is to effectuate the intent of the parties. His
source of authority is the collective-bargaining agreement, and he must
interpret and apply that agreement in accordance with the "industrial
common law of the shop" and the various needs and desires of the
parties. The arbitrator, however, has no general authority to invoke
public laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties... If an
arbitral decision is based "solely upon the arbitrator's view of the requirements of enacted legislation," rather than on an interpretation of
the collective-bargaining agreement, the arbitrator has "exceeded the
272. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.

273. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
274. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1982).

275. 415 U.S. at 50.
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276
scope of the submission," and the award will not be enforced.

The Court thus concluded that a prior arbitral award would not preclude
de novo consideration of related Title VII claims. 2 77 It did, however, acknowledge that district courts could, in appropriate situations, give
"great weight" to arbitral fact findings that are supported by a preserved
278

record.
Post-arbitration deferral should not be readily available with respect
to individual rights cases raising questions under section 8(a)(1) or
8(a)(3). 279 Most bargaining agreements do not have language specifically
protecting the section 7 rights of bargaining unit members. Such questions are indirectly raised through grievances alleging that discipline has
been imposed without "just cause." Although arbitrators should refuse
to sustain discipline imposed because of an employee's exercise of protected section 7 rights, it must be acknowledged that not all arbitrators
are NLRA experts, and many Labor Board doctrines concerning pro-

280
tected concerted activity are not defined with unambiguous precision.
It is thus understandable how an arbitrator might not recognize the exact
boundary between protected and unprotected behavior. Even when it is
apparent that an employer's adverse action toward an employee was partially motivated by impermissible considerations, the arbitrator might
inappropriately dilute statutory protections by sustaining some discipline
in circumstances in which the Labor Board would not have done so.
When a party seeks post-arbitration deferral with respect to an individual rights case, the party should be obliged to demonstrate that the
arbitrator has considered and decided the underlying unfair labor prac276. 415 U.S. at 53 (quoting from United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363

U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
The Court's recent decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647
(1991), directing arbitration of a brokerage firm employee's age discrimination claim, did not concern the basic premise underlying the Gardner-Denver holding. Gilmer was not covered by any
bargaining agreement. He had voluntarily signed an agreement in which he promised to arbitrate all
legal controversies arising from his employment. The arbitrator was expressly authorized to decide
legal questions, and the Supreme Court merely directed Gilmer to honor his contractual pledge.
277. 415 U.S. at 59-60. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728, 734-46
(1981) (employee wage claims under Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1982), not
barred by prior submission of grievances to contractual dispute-resolution procedures); McDonald v.
City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 287-292 (1984) (prior arbitral award not bar to subsequent
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
278. 415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
279. Post-arbitration deferral should be similarly rejected with respect of cases arising under
section 8(b)(1)(A) or 8(b)(2). When it is alleged that the representative labor organization has interfered with the individual rights of bargaining unit members, it is doubtful whether the employer or
the union would adequately represent the interests of the adversely affected employees in arbitral
proceedings. Kansas Meat Packers, 198 N.L.R.B. 543 (1972) (denying arbitral proceeding in unfair
labor practice action).
280. See generally F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 230, at 187-211.
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tice issues. To ensure a uniform national labor policy, the Labor Board
should carefully review the arbitral determination to be certain that the
arbitrator has not inadvertently undermined NLRA protections. The
standard of review in such individual rights cases should be similar to
that accorded to administrative law judge decisions. Deference should be
given to fact findings that are "supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole."' 28 ' Such deference should not, however,
be extended to statutory interpretations. With respect to statutory issues,
the NLRB should review the arbitral reasoning to ensure that individual
employee rights are fully protected.
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PARTIES AND ARBITRATORS

Although court decisions have recognized that grievance-arbitration
procedures are "part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself,"'2 82 labor and management representatives have generally considered
those procedures to be highly confrontational. Labor organizations and
employers have traditionally regarded each other as participants in an
adversarial, rather than a cooperative, process. 28 3 They have frequently
viewed their relationship as a win-lose endeavor, rather than a win-win
situation. Only when dire economic crises have threatened the continued
viability of the business enterprise have workers and managers tended to
adopt cooperative systems providing more direct labor involvement in
2 84
managerial decisionmaking.
Grievance-arbitration procedures should not be viewed as inherently
competitive and adversarial. They simply represent the means through
which employees may question management decisions they believe are
contrary to express or implied terms of the collective contract. Both labor and management officials should consider this process a mutual
search for cooperative solutions to possibly divisive problems. If an employer is able to impose employment conditions that are unfair and contrary to the spirit and intent of the bargaining agreement, the employer
will frequently encounter increased grievances and decreased worker morale and productivity. If, on the other hand, a representative labor or281. This represents the deference appellate courts are required to give to NLRB factual conclusions. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982).
282. See supra note I and accompanying text.
283. See Summers, Worker Participationin the US. and West Germany: A Comparative Study
from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. CoMp. L. 367, 371, 384 (1980).
284. See Levitan & Johnson, After Hard Times--What Hope for Labor-Management Cooperation, DAILY LAB. REP., Sept. 17, 1982, at E-l; McCormick, Union Representatives as Corporate
Directors: The Challenge to the Adversarial Model of Labor Relations, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 219,
222-24 (1982).
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ganization is able to obtain provisions that impede necessary managerial
flexibility, or undermine the competitive status of the business enterprise,
that union may precipitate production transfers to other facilities or
bankruptcy proceedings designed to obtain relief from oppressive contractual obligations. 285 Both sides must acknowledge their symbiotic relationship. Either they work together in a win-win, cooperative manner,
or they risk a win-lose, adversarial result that will benefit neither party.
Grievance-arbitration procedures should thus be considered a
means of achieving mutual accommodations of competing interests. To
enhance the likelihood of such beneficial objectives, negotiating parties
should endeavor to maximize cooperative behavior. The negotiating parties should strive during the initial stages of the grievance procedure to
settle their less controverted disagreements. When they are forced to
confront more momentous conflicts, they should try to stipulate the pertinent facts and agree upon the objective principles that should guide
their grievance deliberations. 2 86 This would enhance the probability of
achieving optimal resolutions of their contractual difficulties. To ensure
maximum disclosure of information and positional theories during the
early stages of the grievance process, they should specify that only those
evidentiary matters and interpretive contentions disclosed during grievance discussions may be presented at subsequent arbitral hearings. Failure to comply with such a disclosure obligation should only be excused
with respect to newly discovered evidence that could not have been ascertained earlier through reasonably diligent efforts.
Grievance discussions should be less formal and less legalistic. Too
many labor and management representatives think that they are functioning as proverbial Philadelphia lawyers. They should not hesitate to
concede uncontroverted factual circumstances and persuasive positional
contentions. They should not advance positions they know are specious
merely to obfuscate the real issues. Both sides need to acknowledge the
gains they jointly attain when contractual disputes are resolved amicably
through the negotiation process. Neither party should ever seek an unconscionable result simply because it believes it might prevail through
resort to disreputable tactics. Grievance-arbitration procedures should
not be considered analogous to poker games in which the most deceitful
person may triumph.
When grievance representatives are unable to achieve a settlement of
285. See generally Craver, The Impact of Financial Crises Upon Collective Bargaining Relationships, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 465 (1988).
286. See R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING To YES 41-57 (1981). See also C. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETrLEMENT 64-67 (1986).
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their contractual dispute, the dissatisfied party may invoke arbitration.
By this time, the parties have generally concluded that a mutual accord
cannot be attained. Before the parties schedule an arbitral hearing, however, they should interpose one final grievance step-pre-arbitration mediation. 28 7 They can arrange a mediation session before a respected
neutral. They can summarize their respective positions and receive important feedback from the mediator.288 That person can ask pertinent
questions and suggest alternative solutions. Skilled mediators frequently
reopen blocked communication channels and help parties to explore options they have not yet contemplated. During such discussions, the parties must be receptive to reasonable mediator suggestions. In their
seminal study, Professors Stephen Goldberg and Jeanne Brett found that
proficient neutrals were able to induce labor and management representatives to resolve amicably approximately 85% of the grievance disputes
28 9
that were otherwise destined for arbitral adjudication.
In those relatively infrequent instances in which negotiating parties
are unable to resolve their contractual disputes through the grievance
process, they may resort to arbitration. Arbitral procedures have recently become increasingly adversarial and legalistic. The vast majority
of cases I have heard during the past decade have involved court reporters and the filing of post-hearing briefs. The claims have been presented
in a manner approaching the formalism of a judicial proceeding. Such an
approach unnecessarily heightens the adversarial aspect of the situation,
and induces participants to view the transactions as win-lose exercises.
Parties should recognize that even arbitral proceedings constitute a
continuation of the collective bargaining process. The parties are merely
asking a neutral third party to assist them with the resolution of a controverted issue. The more cooperatively they approach the arbitral hearing, the more likely they will be to achieve a beneficial result. They
should readily stipulate uncontroverted factual circumstances, the applicable contract language, and the operative decisional criteria. Through
this process, they can narrow the distance between their respective positions, and they may even create a cooperative environment that will generate a belated settlement agreement.
Court reporters should not be required, except when the relevant
factual circumstances are either highly controverted or unusually com287. See Goldberg & Brett, An Experiment in the Mediation of Grievances, 106 MONTHLY LAB.
REV. No. 3, 23 (March, 1983).
288. See generally Craver, When Parties Can't Settle, 26 JuDGEs J. 4 (1987).
289. Id. at 6. When grievances cannot be resolved through such mediation efforts, they are
scheduled for hearing before other arbitrators.
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plex. In the vast majority of cases, the presiding arbitrators can simply
take written notes of the factual presentations. Post-hearing briefs
should only be utilized when difficult interpretive questions are involved.
In most cases, the parties should be able to summarize their respective
positions orally at the conclusion of the arbitral hearing. Such a procedure would both expedite arbitral determinations and significantly decrease litigation costs. The parties would not have to assume the high
cost of transcript preparation, or compensate attorneys for the drafting of
superfluous post-hearing briefs.
Arbitrators can facilitate cooperative behavior through the manner
in which they conduct hearings. Arbitrators should not reward parties
who seek to present new evidence or advance novel contentions during
the arbitration proceeding. Although many arbitrators have been willing
to admit evidence not disclosed during prior grievance discussions, 29°
and have even accepted new positional theories never presented to the
other side, 29 ' they should be reluctant to encourage such uncooperative
conduct. Except when unusual circumstances precluded the discovery of
relevant information through reasonable efforts, evidence not shared with
the other party during prior grievance discussions should not be admitted. Arguments not previously raised should be similarly rejected. The
parties must be encouraged to maximize their exchange of factual items
and positional theories during their grievance sessions. Recalcitrant participants must learn that they will not obtain a tactical advantage
through the disingenuous withholding of pertinent information.
Arbitrators should acknowledge the therapeutic benefits to be derived from arbitral proceedings even by losing parties. It is imperative
that both sides leave the hearing with the belief that they were given full
opportunity to present all arguably relevant material. The admonition of
the late Dean Shulman is as applicable today as it was when originally
articulated in 1955: "The more serious danger is not that the arbitrator
will hear too much irrelevancy, but rather that he will not hear enough of
the relevant." 29 2 Arbitrators should not permit technical evidentiary
rules to prevent the admission of seemingly relevant evidence. Doubts
should be resolved in favor of admissibility. This will ensure that nonprevailing parties will feel that their entire cases were presented and
considered.
Arbitrators should recognize that they also constitute participants in
290. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 34, at 302-04.
291. Id. at 234-37.
292. Shulman, supra note 10, at 1017.
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the continuing collective bargaining process. The arbitrators should not
simply view themselves as stoical adjudicators who can only listen to evidence presented by the parties. They should not hesitate to ask questions
to clarify areas they do not understand. If it becomes apparent that the
parties have failed to consider a possible solution to their controversy,
arbiters should not be reluctant to halt the formal hearing, to point out
the seemingly ignored alternative, and to offer to leave the room while
the parties evaluate this new option. With the permission of both sides,
they might even endeavor to function as a mediator. 293 Parties should
always realize that they are better off with settlements they jointly structure, than with results imposed by outside neutrals who might not fully
appreciate their special needs.
Parties would probably obtain preferable results through the use of
permanent umpires who are appointed to hear grievance disputes
throughout the life of the collective contract, than through resort to ad
hoc arbitrators who are merely appointed to hear specific cases. Such
permanent arbiters would become intimately familiar with the parties
and their respective needs and interests. They would more readily comprehend the exigencies underlying particular controversies, and would be
more likely to recognize when mediative efforts might be propitious.
Where mature relationships have developed, such neutral persons may
regularly employ pre-arbitration mediation techniques to encourage the
joint resolution of disputes that do not really require an adjudicated
solution.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Labor and management representatives, arbitrators, the Labor
Board, and courts should recognize that grievance-arbitration procedures
constitute a continuation of the collective bargaining process. When prearbitration disputes challenge arbitral jurisdiction, courts should resolve
doubts in favor of arbitral authority. When parties question arbitral determinations, judges should be similarly hesitant to substitute their judgment for that of the persons selected by the parties to resolve their
contractual controversies. Only when it is unequivocally clear that arbitrators have ignored their obligation to interpret and apply the express
and implied terms of the bargaining agreement, or have issued decisions
that require the performance of acts, which the parties themselves could
not legally agree to perform, should arbitral awards be judicially rejected.
293. All disclosures made during such settlement discussions would have to be disregarded by
the arbitrator if the parties were unable to achieve a mutually acceptable accord.

1990]

THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS

When deciding pre-arbitration and post-arbitration deferral questions pertaining to unfair labor practice claims, the Labor Board should
recognize the bargaining component of the arbitration process. The Labor Board should thus distinguish between refusal-to-bargain and individual rights cases. Since refusal-to-bargain charges involve collective
interests of immediate concern to representative labor organizations, it is
appropriate to employ pre-arbitration deferral to compel the parties to
resolve their bargaining dispute through the final stage of the negotiation
process. Individual rights charges, however, should not be deferred to
arbitral procedures. The resolution of such cases will generally not be
dependent upon the interpretation of specific contractual language, and
the NLRB is the agency Congress established to ensure the optimal protection of individual rights. Post-arbitration deferral is similarly appropriate with respect to refusal-to-bargain issues that have been presented
and carefully determined in previous arbitral proceedings. Since the
unique aspects of individual rights disputes are frequently not considered
thoroughly in arbitral proceedings, the Labor Board should subject prior
arbitral determinations involving such issues to relatively searching
review.
Negotiating parties should seek to encourage cooperative rather
than adversarial behavior during grievance-arbitration procedures. Participants should be induced to disclose evidentiary information and positional theories during early grievance discussions to enhance the
likelihood of settlement agreements. When grievance sessions do not
culminate in mutual accords, pre-arbitration mediation should be employed to avoid resort to unnecessary arbitral resolution. Arbitrators
and advocates should endeavor to minimize needless legal formalism.
Parties should stipulate to uncontroverted factual circumstances and
contractual claims. The parties should be encouraged to consider unexplored settlement options even during arbitral hearings. Through such
actions; labor and management representatives could enhance their use
of grievance-arbitration procedures that are part and parcel of the collective bargaining process.

